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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
ON FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS’ JUDGMENTS
By
James F. Boyle
Despite the present focus in practice on enterprise risk management (ERM),
academic studies have not responded to the question, “How do risk management
programs (RMPs) influence the business decisions of financial professionals?” This study
addresses this issue by examining the effects of RMPs on the levels of judgment
conservatism and effort exercised by financial professionals. Specifically, in a 2 x 2
between-subjects experiment using experienced financial professionals as participants, I
manipulated RMP type (i.e., robust or ceremonial) and financial risk level (i.e., high or
low). The study examines the effect of RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and
financial risk level on the degree of conservatism and effort of financial professionals’
business decisions.
A robust RMP receives strong support from senior management and board
members, who then hold financial professionals accountable for the level of financial risk
that they assume in making business decisions. A ceremonial RMP lacks any real or
substantive management or board support, but exists primarily to provide an appearance
of a functioning and regulatory compliant RMP. Risk management interview studies
(Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) support the relevance of robust (agency theory)
versus ceremonial (institutional theory) perspectives from risk management practitioners.
vii

Contrary to prediction, no significant relationship was found between RMP type
or the interaction of RMP type with the financial risk level and either the degree of
financial professional judgment conservatism or effort. However, a significant
relationship between the financial risk level alone and the degree of financial professional
judgment effort was found. These findings remain unchanged after adding to the model
various possible control variables reflecting participants’ demographics and experience.
Thus, the results of this study provide no evidence that a robust versus a ceremonial RMP
significantly impacts financial professionals’ decisions about whether to make project
investments or the amount of time or the extent of consultation needed for them to
decide. Additional analyses revealed significant relationships between RMP type or
investment size and other dependent variables.
These results offer important implications for practitioners and policymakers, as
well as contribute to academic research about new applications of accountability and
agency theories.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Enterprise risk management (ERM), which advocates an organization-wide risk
management approach over the traditional methodology of addressing risks individually,
has received considerable attention from U.S. corporate management and board members
since the issuance in 2004 of Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO,
2004). ERM focus renewed after the financial crisis of 2007-08, which was followed by
market and regulatory actions aimed at restoring the public trust in U.S. corporations to
effectively manage organizational risks. In 2008, Standard & Poor’s began to include an
assessment of ERM as part of its criteria for evaluating public companies’ credit ratings
(Standard & Poor’s, 2008). In 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) required all U.S. public companies to disclose their board of directors’ oversight
role over risk management (SEC, 2010). In addition, recent internal auditor surveys (IIA,
2010; PwC: 2011, 2013) have identified risk management as a new top focus of the
internal audit function. In 2013, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) corporate
governance standards were expanded to require audit committees of U.S. public
companies to discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk
exposures (NYSE, 2013).
Despite this widespread attention on ERM in practice, the research literature lacks
studies that address the effects of risk management programs on business decisions of
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financial professionals. McShane et al. (2011: 642) highlighted that, “Driven by the
intense flurry of government and stock exchange activities related to risk management
within corporations, trade and business publications directed at top management are full
of articles related to ERM, yet academic research in the area is still rare.” Because
financial professionals are responsible for approving a firm’s significant investing and
financing activities that are essential to support organizational growth initiatives, it is
important to study ERM’s possible impact on financial professionals’ willingness to take
reasonable risks in making business decisions. The results of empirical studies that
examined the relationship between ERM and firm value have been mixed for financial
services and insurance industry companies. For example, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011)
find a positive relationship and McShane et al. (2011) find no relationship between ERM
and firm value for studies of U.S. insurers. McShane et al. (2011: 653) ask, “Why does a
strong or excellent ERM rating not lead to higher firm value? Is it possible that a strong
ERM culture constrains firm growth that gets reflected in its market value?”
COSO (2004) indicates that the purpose of ERM is to manage organizational risks
to provide reasonable assurance of achieving firm objectives, which ultimately focus on
creating value for shareholders. Therefore, ERM (as a proxy for a robust RMP) may be
“good” (i.e., value creating) for an organization to the extent that any resulting
conservative risk judgments are balanced with and remain within the limits of the
organization’s healthy, entrepreneurial “risk appetite.” In other words, a willingness to
take reasonable financial risks consistent with the achievement of entity objectives is
“good.” However, ERM (as a proxy for a robust RMP) may be “bad” (i.e., value
diminishing) to the extent that any resulting conservative risk decisions are not balanced
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with but rather end up constraining the organization’s healthy, entrepreneurial “risk
appetite.” In other words, an unwillingness to take reasonable financial risks consistent
with the achievement of entity objectives is “bad.” The possibility of this latter case
appears to have prompted the question about whether “a strong ERM culture constrains
firm growth that gets reflected in its market value” (McShane et al., 2011).
The present study addressed these questions by examining the effects of ERM on
the levels of conservatism and effort exercised by financial professionals while making
business decisions. Specifically, in a 2 x 2 experiment using experienced financial
professionals as participants, I manipulated risk management program (RMP) type (i.e.,
robust, agency theory approach to risk management, or ceremonial, institutional theory
approach to create legitimacy) and financial risk level (i.e., high or low, as reflected by a
relatively large or relatively small financial investment) randomly between-subjects. I
then examined the effect of RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and financial risk
level on the degree of financial professionals’ judgment conservatism and effort. In this
study financial professionals made project investment decisions involving potential
financial risks and rewards.
Prior ERM research has examined the extent of ERM implementation (Beasley et
al., 2005), the ERM process (Viscelli, 2013), characteristics of firms that adopt ERM
(Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 2011), factors associated with the impact
of ERM on the internal audit function (Beasley et al., 2008), how governance parties (i.e.,
audit committee members, CFOs and external auditors) view their ERM roles in relation
to the financial reporting process (Cohen et al., 2015), and ERM’s relation to firm value
(e.g., Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011; Baxter et al., 2013). In addition,
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the relevance of a robust (agency theory) versus a ceremonial (institutional theory) RMP
is supported by recent risk management interview studies (i.e., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et
al., 2015). However, these previous studies did not examine the effects of ERM on
management business judgments and decision-making.
Prior financial professional decision-making experiments have focused on such
considerations as gender differences in risk behavior (Powell, 1997), the effects of
participants providing a counter explanation for resource allocation decisions on their
escalation of commitment (Beeler, 1998), the influence of budget goal attainment on
participants’ willingness to make riskier investment decisions (Ruchala, 1999), and the
effects of moral reasoning on financial reporting decisions after Sarbanes-Oxley
(Maroney & McDevitt, 2008). Past financial decision-making surveys have examined
topics including the effects of subordinate participation in making budgetary decisions
(Pasewark et al, 1990), the expanding role of the CFO to include value-added strategy
contributions as well as traditional financial reporting (Sharma & Jones, 2010), and the
importance of trust and risk factors related to budgetary roles of sponsorship management
(Delaney & Guilding, 2011). Additionally, Lin and Sappington (2011) developed a model
that shows the optimal policy to mitigate a manager’s planning moral hazard. However,
these previous academic studies have not examined the effect of RMP type and financial
risk level on financial professionals’ decision-making.
Prior experiments with external (independent) auditors found that establishing or
increasing the levels of accountability have consistently resulted in higher levels of
judgment conservatism and effort (e.g., Asare et al., 2000; DeZoort et al., 2006; Lord,
2002). Additional studies found that auditors’ judgments conform to the preferences of
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the parties to whom the auditors are accountable (e.g., Abbott et al., 2010; Buchman et
al., 1996; DeZoort & Lord, 1994). The interaction of multiple variables (e.g., auditors’
skills and task complexity) has been shown to strengthen the effects of accountability on
auditors’ judgments (e.g., Tan et al., 2002). Finally, the influence of accountability on
audit committee members’ judgments has also been examined (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2008;
Persellin, 2013).
According to responsibility triangle theory (Schlenker et al., 1994: 632),
“responsibility acts as a psychological adhesive that connects an actor to an event and to
relevant prescriptions that should govern conduct.” Auditors (as actors) are responsible
for their audit judgments (events) that are relevant to the auditing standards
(prescriptions) to which the auditors are bound by their identity (position with the audit
firm). Similarly, financial professionals (as actors) are responsible for their financial
judgments (events) that are relevant to the risk management rules (prescriptions) to which
the financial professionals are bound by their identity (organizational role). Furthermore,
the accountability pyramid places governance players charged with the oversight of risk
management (e.g., CEO, CFO, audit committee members) as an audience that holds
actors accountable (i.e., answerable) for the riskiness of actors’ decisions and the related
consequences (events). Actors often play the role of politicians (wanting to gain the
approval and respect of important audiences) and cognitive misers (not wanting to
perform unnecessary mental effort) by making judgments and decisions that are in
accordance with the known preferences of audiences (an acceptability heuristic approach
to coping with accountability pressures) (Schlenker et al., 1994; Tetlock, 1985).
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Standard & Poor’s (2008) indicates that a firm-wide approach to risk provides
assurance that the firm is paying attention to all of its risks. This task requires an
organization-wide, integrated approach to the management of risks that has the support of
board members and senior management. The necessity of ERM support from board
members and senior management within the organization is clearly communicated in the
COSO (2004) ERM definition, as well as in public company risk management standards
(e.g., NYSE, 2013) and regulations (e.g., SEC, 2011; Dodd-Frank, 2010) that mandate
board-level risk oversight.
The purpose of the present study was to examine whether a robust RMP leads to
financial professionals exhibiting higher levels of judgment conservatism and effort, and
whether the RMP type interacts with the financial risk level to exacerbate this effect.
Figure 1 that follows this introduction displays the experimental model.
Despite regulatory mandates for public companies to pay attention to
organizational risks and the considerable focus on RMPs in the marketplace and in
practitioner journals, the results of this experimental study involving experienced
financial professional participants found no evidence supporting any significant
relationship between RMP type (i.e., as either robust or ceremonial) or the interaction of
RMP type with the investment size and the likelihood that a participant would
recommend or decide to make a financial project investment. Furthermore, no change in
significance was noted after adding to the ANOVA model various possible control
variables, including individual participants’ general risk-taking propensity variable based
on the “Risk Taking Index” used by Nicholson, et al. (2005). However, a significant
relationship was revealed between investment size and financial professional judgment
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effort, as measured by how much time it would take and the extent others would be
consulted for participants to develop a recommendation for the case project investment
relative to a typical project investment recommendation. Interestingly, the study also
indicated a significant relationship between investment size and the extent participants
felt accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the project
investment recommendation. Additionally, significant relationships were found between
the RMP type and both the extent participants felt accountable to top management for the
risk of their project investment recommendation and the extent participants believed top
management was risk averse. However, these feelings of accountability to the board of
directors and to top management, and the beliefs of top management risk aversion, did
not appear to impact financial professional judgment conservatism (i.e., likelihood that a
participant recommended to make the case financial project investment).
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. The next section
provides a literature review and develops the study’s hypotheses, which are based
primarily on accountability, agency, and institutional theories. That section is followed by
an explanation of the methodology and then a presentation of the data analysis and
findings. The final section contains the study’s conclusions, limitations, implications, and
opportunities for future research.
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Figure 1: Risk Management Program Type/Financial Professional Judgment
Experimental Model
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Background
ERM use is widespread in practice. Public company risk management standards
(e.g., COSO, 2004; NYSE, 2013) and regulations (e.g., SEC, 2010; Dodd-Frank, 2010)
charge top management and board members of public companies with risk management
oversight responsibilities. It is expected that this recent risk management focus will affect
management decisions across organizations if the risk management focus is substantive.
Specifically, financial professionals may feel pressured to more carefully consider risks
associated with their business decisions when they are accountable to top management
and the board who likely convey a greater preference for risk aversion if the risk
management focus is substantive. The current literature has not looked at these aspects of
risk management.
The most widely accepted ERM definition in practice today was provided by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in its
2004 Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework, as follows.
ERM is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and
other personnel, applied in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within
its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of
entity objectives.
This COSO (2004) definition identifies key characteristics of the ERM process.
The ERM framework is an integrated approach to managing organizational risks with
9
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board level risk oversight. The ERM process occurs within a strategic setting and
considers the entity’s particular risk appetite. Finally, the ERM process relates risks to
providing reasonable assurance of achieving organizational objectives. COSO (2004)
goes on to identify four categories of entity objectives: strategic, operational, reporting,
and compliance. Specific entity risks may also be grouped within these categories. Recent
studies indicate that CFOs also view their role as value creators involved in the entity’s
strategic activities (Sharma & Jones, 2010). The present study asks financial professional
participants to address financial risks associated with strategic objectives by making
judgments related to project investment decisions involving varying degrees of financial
risk and reward. Professional financial journals and prior financial professional academic
studies indicate that such project investment decisions (a.k.a. capital budgeting) are
common in practice for financial professionals (e.g., Farragher et al., 2001; Moreno et al.,
2002; Pike, 1988). Additionally, one of the two parts of the Certified Management
Accountant (CMA) exam, which is administered by the Institute of Management
Accountants (IMA), is entirely devoted to financial decision-making, including such
risk/reward investment decisions.
Prior Literature
While practitioner journals are full of ERM articles targeting management and
board members to build ERM awareness and share best practices, academic studies
addressing ERM are limited, and none appear to consider ERM’s effects on financial
professional judgments. Prior financial professional decision-making studies likewise do
not examine the influence of ERM on judgment. Experimental studies using auditors and
audit committee members as participants reveal the effects of varying levels of
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accountability on participants’ judgments. Another experiment examined the effect of
inherent risk taking propensity and accountability on the riskiness of participants’
decisions. A selection of studies on ERM, financial professional decision-making,
accountability effects on audit-related judgments, and individual inherent risk-taking
propensity are presented and summarized in the following sections.
Enterprise Risk Management
ERM and company characteristics. Some researchers have examined
characteristics of firms adopting ERM. Beasley et al. (2005) surveyed chief audit
executives and found that the extent of ERM implementation to be positively related to
the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO). The authors also found that board
independence, ERM support from the CEO and CFO, the presence of a Big 4 auditor,
firm size, and organizations in the banking, insurance, and education industries also
signaled a more mature ERM process.
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) studied a sample of firms that have appointed a chief
risk officer (CRO) as a proxy for ERM adoption and found that firms that appointed a
CRO had greater financial leverage than matched firms that did not appoint a CRO. This
suggests that firms with higher relative debt levels are more likely to appoint a CRO to
mitigate the increased financial risk exposure (e.g., inability to repay outstanding debt).
Finally, Pagach and Warr (2011) also examine a sample of firms that hired a CRO
as a proxy for ERM adoption. The authors found that ERM adoption is more likely for
firms that are larger, more volatile, and have greater institutional ownership.
Interestingly, the authors also found that ERM adoption (i.e., CRO appointment) is more
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likely in firms that grant higher CEO risk-taking incentives. In this case it appears that
boards implement ERM to help offset the CEO’s risk-taking compensation incentives.
ERM and internal audit. The Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA’s) 2010 Global
Internal Audit Survey of over 13,500 internal auditors, chief audit executives, and
managers from 107 countries identified risk management as a top area of internal audit
focus over the next five years, with 79% of respondents reporting an expected increase in
internal audit activity of risk management. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC’s) 2011 State
of the Internal Audit Profession Study, involving interviews with chief audit executives
(CAEs), likewise revealed a planned increase of internal audit focus on ERM programs
over the next three years reported by 79% of CAE’s interviewed. The PwC 2013 survey
also identified coordination with ERM and other risk functions, as well as coverage of
emerging risks, as characteristics of high-performing internal audit functions.
Furthermore, the IIA provides an illustration (the ERM “fan”) that shows
appropriate ERM roles that internal auditors should and should not undertake (IIA: 2004,
2011). Essentially, the IIA prescribes that internal auditors should pursue ERM assurance
activities, but avoid ERM management activities so that auditor independence and
objectivity can be maintained.
Beasley et al. (2008) conducted a survey of CAEs from 122 organizations
worldwide (79 in the U.S.) to explore the impact of ERM on the internal audit function.
They found that ERM has the greatest effect on internal audit activities when the ERM
process was more complete, the CFO and audit committee called for ERM focus by
internal audit, CAE tenure is longer, ERM leadership is provided by internal audit, and
the entity is in the banking or education industry.
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ERM process and roles. Viscelli (2013) conducted a qualitative study on the ERM
process by interviewing ERM champions from 14 organizations and found that ERM
implementation was associated with meeting strategic needs and encouragement by the
board of directors and audit committee. Key players in the ERM process were internal
audit (IA), general counsel, the audit committee, the CFO, and the board of directors.
Despite the IIA’s ERM “fan” cautioning IA to avoid undertaking an ERM management
role, the study found that IA usually assumed ownership over ERM leadership.
Cohen et al. (2015) also conducted a qualitative study on ERM involving semistructured interviews of 32 experienced audit partners, CFOs, and audit committee (AC)
members from 11 public companies. This study focused on how the participants view
ERM and their ERM roles as specifically related to the financial reporting process. The
authors found that all respondents defined ERM by emphasizing risk assessment and
operational effectiveness/efficiency. However, only CFOs and AC members considered
ERM strategic elements, whereas auditors’ narrower ERM definition neglected to
mention ERM strategic components. Additionally, CFOs and AC members adopted a
resource dependency view of ERM as it relates to financial reporting, with a balanced
view of risk assessment and strategic objectives. In contrast, auditors embraced an agency
perspective of ERM that fails to recognize the risk/reward trade-off of considering both
the risks and potential payoffs associated with pursuing strategic objectives.
Interview studies on robust versus ceremonial risk management processes.
Viscelli (2013) conducted semi-structured interviews with ERM champions (key
individuals involved with an ERM implementation) from 14 organizations to examine
how institutional theory may be at work in the ERM process. This study considered
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coercive, mimetic, and normative “isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) as possible
ways firms may adapt to (especially new and uncertain) rules and belief systems of their
environment, such as those created by the recent ERM focus. Institutional theory suggests
that the ERM process will be driven and manifested by firms becoming more alike in (1)
responding to regulatory requirements and pressures (coercive isomorphism), (2)
adopting ERM “best practices” from other successful organizations (mimetic
isomorphism), and (3) pursuing ERM training and using risk consultants in order to be
viewed as legitimate (normative isomorphism). Viscelli (2013) found evidence of
institutional theory in the ERM process, especially by firms adopting ERM “best
practices” (e.g., COSO framework) and using risk consultants (e.g., Big 4 firms). In
addition, while 57% of ERM champions exhibited an agency theory ERM perspective by
identifying “strategic need to better identify risk” as a reason why organizations
undertake an ERM process, 29% of ERM champions reflected an institutional theory
ERM view by mentioning “regulatory requirements” (coercive isomorphism) as a factor
for implementing an ERM process.
In further support of the role of institutional theory in the ERM process, another
survey conducted by Beasley et al. (2011) of 455 executives (mostly CFOs) from a
variety of industries and sizes revealed that 37.5% of all respondents and 52.9% public
company respondents noted “regulatory demands” as a factor “mostly” or “extensively”
leading to increased executive focus on risk management activities.
Finally, while focusing primarily on the roles of agency theory and resource
dependence theory in examining ERM and the financial reporting process, Cohen et al.
(2015) acknowledge that institutional theory may also be relevant when ERM is viewed
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as symbolic in nature and governance players are ineffectual when monitoring risks in
“form” (i.e., ceremoniously following a “checklist” approach) rather than in “substance”
(i.e., robustly questioning risk practices).
ERM and firm value. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) conducted a study of 117
publicly traded U.S. insurers and found that ERM adoption, as evidenced by the existence
of a CRO, was positively related to firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. In contrast,
McShane et al. (2011) examined a sample of 82 publicly traded U.S. insurers and found
no increase in value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) for firms achieving higher ERM ratings
using Standard and Poor’s risk management rating as an independent measure of ERM
quality. Baxter et al. (2013) also used the Standard and Poor’s risk management rating as
a proxy for ERM quality for a sample of financial services companies and found no
relation between ERM quality and market performance prior to (period January to
August 2008) or during (period September 2008 to February 2009) the financial crisis of
2008. However, ERM quality was positively associated with higher returns after the
financial crisis. Greater firm complexity, less resource restraint, and better corporate
governance were all controlled in the study, as they were also found to be positively
associated with ERM quality.
Based on the ERM research discussed in the preceding sections, studies to date
have reviewed characteristics of firms adopting ERM, the impact of ERM on the internal
audit function, the ERM process and ERM roles, and the relationship between ERM and
firm value. The present study makes a new contribution to existing ERM studies by
examining the effects of ERM on managers’ decision-making in general and on financial
professionals’ decision-making in particular.
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Financial Professional Decision-Making
A sample of important financial professional decision-making studies is discussed
below to provide a contextual framework and to identify appropriate control variables for
the present study.
Financial professional experiments. Powell (1997) conducted an experiment with
undergraduate and graduate business students as participants who made financial
decisions related to insurance coverage and the currency market and found that females
exhibited less risk-seeking behavior than males, after controlling for task familiarity and
framing. Beller (1998) performed an experiment in which 288 accounting and finance
professionals made resource allocation decisions before and after receiving feedback on
the success of their earlier decisions. However, certain participants were required to
provide explanations about why certain unexpected outcomes might occur before
receiving feedback. This counter-explanation intervention strategy was found to increase
reasoning and decrease escalation of commitment tendencies. Ruchala (1999)
administered an experiment involving 60 students to make project investment decisions
and found that participants make riskier investment decisions when they are not
achieving budget goals, and this effect was exacerbated by the presence of bonus-based
compensation. These results are consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) which suggests that professionals will be risk seeking when in a loss position
(analogous to not achieving budget goals) and risk averse when in a gain position
(analogous to achieving budget goals). Maroney and McDevitt (2008) conducted an
experiment using 72 MBA students to examine whether the Section 302 certification
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (requiring officers to certify that the
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organization’s financial statements are fairly presented) affect financial reporting
decisions. The study found an interaction between the participants’ moral reasoning level
and the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such that the influence of the SarbanesOxley Act was significantly positively associated with the reported loss for participants
with lower moral reasoning, but not for participants with higher moral reasoning.
Financial decision effectiveness under accountability. The present study examines
the judgments of financial professionals who may be paying so much attention to risks in
accordance with the risk management expectations of top management and board
members that the financial professionals end up taking longer to make excessively
conservative business decisions. Adelberg and Batson (1978) conducted an experiment
with university students who allocated financial resources among financial aid applicants
when the client’s financial needs exceeded available resources. The authors found that
participants who were accountable to resource providers and recipients made less
effective resource allocation decisions than non-accountable participants, who made more
effective, tough resource allocation decisions. Thus, participants who were accountable to
multiple parties made less effective financial resource decisions because they did not
want to disappoint the parties (audiences) to whom the participants were accountable.
Financial professional surveys and models. Pasewark and Welker (1990) asked
financial executives to recall both a successful and an unsuccessful budget decision,
along with the degree of subordinate participation in each decision. The results supported
the recommendation of the Vroom-Yetton model to use high levels of participation in
budgetary decision-making to enhance the likelihood of success. Sharma and Jones
(2010) surveyed 241 CFOs and found that the role of today’s CFO is expanding from the
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traditional financial reporting to include value creation strategy contributions. Delaney
and Guilding (2011) conducted a survey of Australian organizations and found that trust
and risk are significant factors affecting the importance of budgetary roles in the
sponsorship investment decision-making setting. Lin and Sappington (2011) address the
planning moral hazard faced by a CEO (the “principal”) who motivates a manager (an
“agent”) to assess and make project investments to maximize performance. A planning
moral hazard may result in the case of a manager who does not exercise due diligence in
evaluating a project that the manager already considers to be either profitable or
unprofitable. The study recommends a compensation structure to mitigate the planning
moral problem that will induce the manager to under-invest in projects thought to be
profitable and over-invest in projects initially considered to be unprofitable in order to
encourage a thoughtful evaluation of each project unbiased by initial perceptions about
profitability.
Overall, the studies on financial professional decision-making have considered
whether certain factors (e.g., gender, loss or gain situation) affect risk taking propensity,
the influence of accountability on financial decision effectiveness, and strategies to
improve project investment choices. However, the impact of an organization’s RMP type
and financial risk level on financial professionals’ judgments, the topic of the present
study, has not yet been explored.
Accountability Effects on Audit-Related Judgments
Auditor studies. Although research on the effects of accountability on financial
professionals’ decisions is limited, there is a large body of research examining
accountability effects on auditors’ and audit committee members’ judgments. These
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studies inform my research on accountability and financial professionals’ judgments.
Asare et al. (2000) conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment involving 91
auditors making judgments about audit testing strategies to uncover an unexplained
increase in a client’s gross profit margin. Accountable auditors (i.e., subject to superior
review) exhibited higher judgment conservatism, as evidenced by a focus on the breath of
testing (examining different potential hypotheses to explain the fluctuation), which is
more defensible than a depth strategy (extensive testing a few hypotheses) when the
preferences of supervisors are unknown. Additionally, the accountability condition led to
an increase in the extent of testing (level of effort).
DeZoort et al. (2006) manipulated accountability at four levels (i.e., anonymity,
review, justification, and feedback) for 160 auditors from four Big 4 firms and one
national accounting firm in an experiment that required auditors to make materiality
judgments. The authors found that an increase in the level of accountability was
associated with an increase in judgment conservatism and effort, as well as a decrease in
judgment variability. Similarly, Hoffman and Patton (1997) examined the effects of
accountability to superiors on the fraud risk judgments of 44 Big 6 auditors and found
that accountability was positively related to judgment conservatism. This study also
found that accountability was not related to an exacerbation of the dilution effect related
to an over-interpretation of irrelevant information.
Kennedy (1993) administered an experiment to 58 executive MBA students and
171 Big 6 auditors involving judgments about a client’s ability to continue as a goingconcern. This study examined whether accountability mitigates recency effects (i.e., the
overweighting of evidence presented later in a sequence) and found that only the MBA
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students’ judgments were significantly affected by such recency effects. Furthermore,
MBA students held accountable (through justification) were able to overcome recency
effects through increased effort.
Moreover, Koonce et al. (1995) conducted a study of 202 advanced-in-charge
auditors and found that accountable auditors (i.e., auditors anticipating subsequent audit
review of their judgments) provided more justifications (i.e., higher levels of effort) than
non-accountable auditors for revisions to the audit plan in response to management’s
explanation of unexpected account fluctuations and ratios that normally would require
additional audit work. Johnson and Kaplan (1991) performed an experiment with 101
auditor participants that involved inventory obsolescence judgments and discovered that
accountable auditors displayed higher consensus (lower judgment variability) and higher
self-insight (level of effort) than non-accountable auditors. Lord (1992) conducted a
between-subject experiment with 30 experienced audit managers and found that auditors
subject to accountability were less likely to issue an unqualified audit opinion than
auditors who decisions were not subject to review. This finding supports a positive
relationship between accountability and auditor judgment conservatism.
The results of additional auditor studies (Abbott, et al. 2010; Buchman et al.,
1996; DeZoort & Lord, 1994) are consistent with the acceptability heuristic (Tetlock:
1992, 1985; Mero et al., 2007) strategy of coping with accountability by making
judgments that are acceptable to those parties to whom the auditors are accountable.
Abbott et al. (2010) surveyed 134 chief internal auditors and found a positive association
between the level of audit committee (AC) oversight (measured by reporting lines,
termination rights, and budgetary control) and the amount of internal audit function (IAF)
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budget allocated to internal control activities. Conflicts may exist between management’s
expectations of IAF activities (e.g., emphasis on operational goals and cost savings) and
the AC’s expectations of IAF activities (e.g., internal controls focus). The study results
suggest that the IAF will seek to satisfy the expectations of the party providing oversight
over the IAF.
Buchman et al. (1996) conducted an experiment to test the effect on auditors’
decisions of holding the auditors accountable to others with known views. Ninety-two
Big 8 auditors were randomly assigned to three manipulation groups with different levels
of accountability: accountable to no one, accountable to the client, or accountable to an
audit partner. Experienced auditor participants held accountable to an audit partner for
their judgments (1) chose qualified opinions that conformed to the conservative views of
audit partners and (2) exerted more effort by listing more items to justify their choices.
The authors speculate that the same accountability effects were not observed for
inexperienced auditors because experienced auditors were more aware of the implications
and issues.
DeZoort and Lord (1994) performed an experiment in which 146 auditors from an
international accounting firm were randomly assigned to one of three obedience pressure
groups: no pressure (control group), audit manager pressure, and audit partner pressure.
The auditors made ethical judgments about whether to obey inappropriate instructions
from superiors. The results indicated that auditors subject to higher obedience pressure
(Milgram, 1974) were significantly more likely to follow inappropriate instructions from
either an audit manager or audit partner (and thereby violate normal professional
standards) than auditors not subject to such pressure. Furthermore, auditors’ judgments
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were not significantly affected by their individual attitudes toward authority, as measured
by a General Attitudes Toward Institutional Authority Scale (Rigby, 1982).
In addition, Tan et al. (2002) observed the interaction effects of skills and
complexity in an experiment of 82 auditors from two Big 6 firms who were administered
audit tasks of varying complexity and randomly assigned to a condition of either high
accountability (i.e., required to provide their names and were informed their answers
would be reviewed by a superior with unknown preferences) or low accountability (i.e.,
participants’ names and answers would remain anonymous). High (low) auditors’ level of
knowledge was determined by whether they possessed above (below) the median
knowledge scores on designated audit tasks. Auditor performance declined for increasing
task complexity only under conditions of either low knowledge/high accountability or
high knowledge/low accountability. Performance was unaffected for increasing task
complexity under conditions of either high knowledge/high accountability or low
knowledge/low accountability.
Audit committee studies. Moving to the study of audit committee member
judgments, DeZoort et al. (2008) performed an experiment examining responses before
and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) from 372 public audit
committee (AC) members (131 pre-SOX from DeZoort et al. [2003] and 241 post SOX).
The study found that AC members’ (especially AC members who were CPAs) support
for an auditor proposed adjustment is significantly higher in the post-SOX period than in
the pre-SOX period. Additionally, study participants supporting the auditor-proposed
adjustment believed more strongly that AC members in the post-SOX period are more
conservative and have more power than they did pre-SOX. This study shows how the
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passage of a regulation (i.e., SOX) may create a high accountability condition that results
in more conservative judgments (i.e., judgments that conform to the objectives of the
regulation).
Persellin (2013) conducted a similar experiment with 92 Executive MBAs
participants serving as proxies for AC members. This study required participants to make
judgments on their support for an income-reducing audit adjustment when AC members
are compensated either primarily with short-term options or in cash. The study also
examined the effect of an additional manipulated condition of either a high or low
likelihood of Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) audit engagement inspection.
The study results confirmed the main effect of a positive association between option
compensation and less support for the income-reducing proposed audit adjustment. The
results also found a significant interaction between the likelihood of PCAOB inspection
and option compensation such that option compensation only affected the support for the
income-reducing proposed audit adjustment when the likelihood of PCAOB inspection
was low.
Overall, the studies of accountability in the auditing realm suggest that
accountability pressure leads to increased effort and more conservative judgments.
Further, the recent increase in risk management accountability pressure should lead to
financial professionals exerting more effort to make more conservative financial business
decisions.
Individual Participant General Risk-Taking Propensity
Weigold and Schlenker (1991) conducted an experiment with psychology
students who were identified as either self-described high or low risk-takers (based on a
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pretest questionnaire). The participants were given the choice between pairs of lotteries
with the same expected value but varying levels of risk/reward (i.e., a higher risk lottery
has a lower probability of a higher payout, whereas a lower risk lottery has a higher
probability of a lower payout). Additionally, participants either were required
(accountable) or not required (unaccountable) to explain and justify their decisions to
others. When accountable, low risk-takers became significantly risk averse, but high risktakers actually made slightly riskier decisions. A second study revealed that accountable
low risk-takers found security in extreme risk aversion, whereas accountable high risktakers admired and believed others admired high over low risk taking decisions.
In the present study, the general risk-taking propensities of financial professional
participants was measured (based on participants’ responses to risk-taking index
questions from Nicholson et al., 2005) and examined to both control for individual
participants’ general risk-taking propensities and determine if RMP type interacts with
such risk-taking propensities to effect financial professionals’ judgments.
Theory and Hypotheses Development
Agency Theory versus Institutional Theory
Agency theory is the predominant corporate governance perspective and heavily
relied upon in accounting and finance literature (Cohen et al., 2008). Agency theory is
derived from the fundamental agency problem of divergent interests between owners
(principals) and managers (agents) associated with the corporate form of organization.
This agency problem is caused by the separation of firm ownership (i.e., by shareholders)
and control (i.e., by management) because “the decision process is in the hands of
professional managers whose interests are not identical to those of residual claimants”
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(Fama & Jensen, 1983: 331). Therefore, agency theory views the role of the board as an
independent party that vigilantly monitors management to prevent opportunistic behavior
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Institutional theory states that the creation of ceremonial structures for the benefit
of constituencies, rather than the establishment of structures observable to external
parties, are more related to the achievement of expected organizational outcomes
(Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998). An implication of institutional theory in corporate
governance is that the board may focus on ceremonial and symbolic roles in times of
uncertain or ambiguous settings (Cohen et al., 2008), such as in an environment in which
a firm seeks to manage an array of complex organizational risks. An example of a
“ceremonial” practice of a public company board is to disclose the board’s risk
management oversight role in compliance with SEC proxy requirements (SEC, 2010).
Under institutional theory structural processes become more similar as organizations
comply with governance regulations and follow “best practices” to create appearances of
legitimacy and effective oversight (Beasley et al., 2009).
In summary, agency theory emphasizes an independent, vigilant board monitoring
of management, whereas institutional theory emphasizes ceremonial roles of governance
where the appearance of legitimacy is more important than any real substantive oversight.
In the present study, a robust RMP is supported by agency theory and characterized by
diligent board risk oversight, the presence of an experienced, active chief risk officer
(CRO), and the evaluation of risk management effectiveness by competent internal
auditors. In contrast, a ceremonial RMP is supported by institutional theory and lacks any
true board risk oversight, has appointed the controller who is inexperienced with risk
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management as a symbolic action, and does not have an internal audit function that is
focused on reviewing the risk management process.
Accountability Theory
Accountability can be defined as “the quality or state of being accountable;
especially: an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s
actions” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability). In academic
literature, “accountability refers to being answerable to audiences for performing up to
certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and other
charges” (Schlenker et al., 1994: p. 634). Accountable people can be made to explain and
justify their decisions, and their conduct may be judged, scrutinized or sanctioned by
audiences (Tetlock: 1985, 1992). People are motivated by several reasons to seek the
approval and respect of audiences to whom they are accountable, such as symbolic
psychological and tangible material benefits. The acceptability heuristic approach to
coping with the pressures of accountability when the preferences of audiences are known
is to simply make decisions that are in accordance with the preferences of audiences. This
approach is consistent with the view of people as cognitive misers who seek to minimize
the mental effort associated with considering alternative choices and instead just adopt
the salient “acceptable” choice (Tetlock: 1985, 1992). In the present study, a fully
functional ERM (where the board is charged with oversight of the organization’s risk
management program) is a proxy for a robust RMP. Therefore, in a robust RMP the
conservative preferences of top management and board members related to the
management of risks are known by financial professionals.
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The responsibility (a.k.a. accountability) triangle consists of prescriptions (rules
for conduct), events (action taken by actors and related consequences), and identity
(actor’s roles that connects him or her to the prescription and event) (Schlenker et al.
1994). The evaluative reckoning of accountable people (actors) requires that the evaluator
(audience) has information about prescriptions, events, and identity images and the
connections among them. Accountability has a greater influence when either it relates to
more important prescriptions (i.e., prescriptions that are highly regarded and have high
potential personal consequences for the actor) or the relevant event has more important
consequences (e.g., greater potential financial impact on the company) (Schlenker &
Weigold, 1989). In the present study financial professionals are the actors, top
management (including the Chief Risk Officer) and the board (especially the audit
committee) are the audience, and ERM (i.e., how effectively risks are managed) is the
prescription. Accordingly, a greater accountability impact is likely for a robust RMP that
views the ERM prescription in high regard and the actors’ ERM event (actions) as having
an important consequence than for a ceremonial RMP that considers the ERM
prescription more as a symbolic rule to (ceremoniously) follow and actors’ ERM actions
more as ritualistic events.
Hypotheses
As discussed above, a robust RMP is supported by the agency theory view that
members of senior management (e.g., CEO, CFO) and the board will genuinely support
the RMP objectives, vigilantly monitor the risk assumed by managers, and hold financial
professionals accountable for the riskiness of their financial decisions. In contrast, a
ceremonial RMP is supported by the institutional theory perspective that senior
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management and board members lack real support of the RMP objectives, employ
symbolic structures (e.g., appointing a CRO) and take ritualistic actions (e.g., publicly
disclosing the board’s risk oversight role) to advance the appearances of legitimate risk
monitoring, and fail to require any substantive accountability for risks assumed by
financial professionals in their business decisions.
In accordance with the acceptability heuristic approach to coping with genuine
accountability pressure applied by senior management and board members to pay
attention to risk management within a robust RMP, financial professionals will seek to
gain the approval and respect of the parties to whom they are accountable (i.e., senior
management and the board) by making decisions that are in agreement with their known
preferences. Therefore, financial professionals will likely make more conservative
business decisions to reflect the conservative risk preferences of senior management and
board members that provide oversight over a robust RMP. Participants were also asked
about the factors that they considered in making case decisions to identify the reason(s)
for their judgments. Additionally, numerous accountability studies discussed earlier find
that greater accountability levels also result in more effort exerted by the accountable
parties (actors) in order to fulfill the expectations of audiences that actors exercise due
diligence. Therefore, a robust RMP is likely to also result in more effort exerted by
financial professionals. Based on the above discussion, the first set of hypotheses follows:
Hypothesis 1: Financial professionals of companies with a robust risk
management program (RMP) will make more conservative financial investment
business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a ceremonial
RMP.
Hypothesis 2: Financial professionals of companies with a robust risk
management program (RMP) will exert more effort while making financial
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investment business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a
ceremonial RMP.
As the combined importance of the triangle of responsibility elements become
more potent (i.e., increase), so do the potential consequences for the actor (e.g., financial
professional) at the time of evaluative reckoning (Schlenker et al., 1994). For example, in
high financial risk environments financial decisions become more important and
consequential than in low financial risk environments (to the extent that an individual
perceives risk and responsibility for the specific judgment/decision). In other words, if
risk is low (i.e., low probability of loss or small financial amounts are at risk), then the
level of accountability is not expected to be as important. However, when risk is higher
(i.e., higher probability of loss or larger financial amounts at risk), the stakes are raised,
and the overseeing party’s view should become more important to the decision maker.
Therefore, when financial risk level is high, the effect of a robust RMP on financial
professionals is expected to be greater than when financial risk level is low. Additionally,
Baxter et al. (2013) found that the market reacted positively to ERM quality only after the
2008 financial crisis, but not before the market collapse. In other words, ERM only
mattered to the market when the level of risk was high. Similarly, in the present study it
is likely financial professionals’ levels of judgment conservatism and effort will conform
more closely with the (risk averse) preferences of audiences within a robust RMP and
when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of financial risk is low. In
other words, it is expected that the robust RMP will matter more to financial
professionals for high financial risk levels. Based on the above discussion, the second set
of hypotheses (depicted in Figure 2) follows:

30

Hypothesis 3: The effect of robust RMP on financial investment judgment
conservatism is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level
of financial risk is low.
Hypothesis 4: The effect of robust RMP on financial investment judgment effort is
greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of financial
risk is low.
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Figure 2: Financial Professional Judgment Showing Predicted Interaction
Between RMP Program Type and Financial Risk Level
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High Risk
Level

Financial Professional
Judgment
Conservatism/Effort

Low Risk
Level
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CEREMONIAL

ROBUST

Risk Management Program Type

Note: The non-parallel lines indicate the anticipated ordinal interaction between risk
management program type and financial risk level. The highest levels of financial
professional judgment conservatism and effort are predicted to result for a robust RMP
within a high financial risk level.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Experimental Design and Case Development
I used an experimental design technique similar to the one used in DeZoort et al.
(2006). The experimental materials consisted of an informed consent, followed by a brief
case study that included sections for company and industry background, financial
performance, capital budgeting policy: required rates of return on project investments,
top management, board of directors and audit committee, external independent auditor,
internal audit department, and four different versions – for each of the two risk
management program types and each of the two financial risk levels (2 x 2 betweensubjects design).
The base case materials represented a publicly-traded household appliance
manufacturing company (the Company) listed on the New York Stock Exchange and
operating within a relatively robust industry, with the Company’s financial performance
and position comparable to average companies in the industry. The Company’s 5-year
historical net sales, net income, and total assets were derived from industry benchmark
data, and its capital budgeting policy including the required rate of return on project
investments is presented. Top management and the board of directors (including the audit
committee) meet regularly and are qualified and experienced. The same external
(independent) accounting firm has expressed a clean audit opinion on the Company for
each of the past five years, and the Company has an active internal audit department.
32
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A realistic and understandable case was developed by leveraging the experience
of my professional accounting colleagues (many practicing CPAs with over five years of
professional experience) and myself, as well as examining benchmark information and
financial data of public companies in the household appliance industry and conducting a
comprehensive literature review of enterprise risk management (ERM) academic studies
(e.g., Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2015) and a study of current
ERM regulations and guidelines (e.g., COSO, 2004, 2009; NYSE, 2013; Standard and
Poor’s, 2008). In addition, my dissertation committee reviewed and provided feedback on
the initial case that led to several rounds of constructive edits. Finally, four other
academics with expertise in the area reviewed the case and provided substantive feedback
leading to additional edits (particularly in the area of ERM public company proxy
requirements and typical management and board ERM roles and responsibilities) that
further enhanced the realism as well as the understandability of the final version of the
case (see Appendix B for copy of case instrument).
Table 1 shows the 2 x 2 experimental design and expected cell sizes with two
RMP types and two financial risk levels (total of four cells). Similar accounting studies
have obtained approximately 15 responses per cell (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003).
Accordingly, the goal in this study was to secure approximately 15 completed
instruments per cell, for a total of approximately 60 participants.
Table 1: 2 x 2 Experimental Design and Expected Cell Sizes

Robust
Risk Management Program
Ceremonial
Risk Management Program

High Financial Risk
15-20 Participants

Low Financial Risk
15-20 Participants

15-20 Participants

15-20 Participants
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The online instrument was designed and administered in Qualtrics. Participants
were experienced financial professionals and accessed the instrument through a link that
was sent to them in three separate email requests by the Institute of Management
Accountants (IMA) Director of Research (the IMA provided a research grant to support
this study). These email requests were sent to IMA members that met the requisite
experience and other selection criteria (the IMA has approximately 70,000 members). In
addition, a fourth email request was sent to other suitable experienced accounting
professionals (known through my professional network) in order to obtain the required
minimum participants. Appendix A contains samples of the request emails. The
instrument included a total of 49 items. However, each participant was presented with
only a subset of items as determined by the experimental cells in which each participant
was randomly assigned.
The instrument was submitted for review to the Institutional Review Boards at the
University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, who approved the final version of
the instrument after suggested edits to the consent form were made.
Experimental Task
The instrument first presented an informed consent to each participant. Only
participants who indicated their agreement and consent to participate in the study were
able to proceed to access and complete the study. Upon providing consent, all
participants were presented with the base case information. The participants were then
randomly assigned to one of the two risk management program types (i.e., either robust
or ceremonial) and given information describing the RMP type to which they were
randomly assigned. Next participants were again randomly assigned to one of the two
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financial risk levels (i.e., high or low) and provided information describing a possible
new product introduction, along with the related financial risk level (high financial risk
represented by a relatively large financial investment and low financial risk represented
by a relatively small financial investment) to which they were randomly assigned.
The participants were then asked to make two judgments - one related to
judgment conservatism and one related to judgment effort, which are the two primary
dependent variables of the study. Open-ended questions followed asking participants the
factors that they considered in their judgment responses. Participants were then asked
other questions that are examined as part of additional analysis. Then two manipulation
check questions (one for the RMP type manipulation and one for the financial risk level
manipulation) were presented, followed by questions about how realistic and
understandable the case was, demographic and control data, participants’ general risktaking propensity, and the primary type of risk management programs that participants
experienced in their careers. The instrument concluded with an invitation to participate in
a gift certificate drawing and a question asking whether they would like to receive a
summary report of the survey responses. Table 2 on the following page provides an
outline of the Qualtrics instrument flow.
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Table 2: Instrument Flow
Instructions and Informed Consent
Base Case Information

Risk Management Program Type
Manipulation 1:
Robust RMP

Risk Level
Type 1:
High
Risk

Risk Management Program Type
Manipulation 2:
Ceremonial RMP

Risk Level
Type 2:
Low
Risk

Risk Level
Type 1:
High
Risk

Financial Manager Judgment Conservatism
Judgment Conservatism Factors Considered
Financial Manager Judgment Effort
Judgment Effort Factors Considered
Manipulation Checks
Survey Question - Realistic and Understandable
Demographic and Control Data
Survey Question - Describe RMP Type
They Encounter in Practice
Invitation to Drawing

Risk Level
Type 2:
Low
Risk
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In this study, participants were asked to assume that they were employed as
financial managers charged with evaluating and making recommendations about whether
the Company should pursue project investment opportunities. Furthermore, as financial
managers of the Company, they should assume that they report to the Controller and that
the success or failure of their investment recommendations is considered in their
performance evaluation and in determining their base pay adjustments and any incentive
pay (e.g., bonuses).
The first primary judgment task related to the participants’ level of judgment
conservatism in responding to the request to indicate the likelihood they would
recommend that the Company make the financial investment to manufacture a new
household appliance (i.e., a swift-cook oven). Such investment project decisions (a.k.a.
capital budgeting) are common in practice for financial professionals (e.g., Farragher et
al., 2001; Moreno et al., 2002; Pike, 1988) and prominently covered on the Certified
Management Accountant (CMA) exam.
The second primary judgment task related to the participants’ level of judgment
effort in responding to two separate requests. The first request was to indicate how much
time participants would take to develop a recommendation for this project investment
relative to a typical project investment recommendation. The second request was to
indicate the extent that they would consult with others to develop a recommendation for
this project investment relative to a typical project investment recommendation. In
addition, participants were asked to describe the factors they considered in making each
judgment and to indicate the individual(s) with whom they would consult.
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The participants were then asked additional questions each on a sliding scale from
0 to 100 for the purpose of better understanding their levels of judgment conservatism
and judgment effort in deciding whether to recommend that the Company make the case
project investment and how much relative time and consultation they would need to make
their recommendation.
Independent Variables Case Manipulations
In the case of a robust RMP the board of directors has directed management to
establish an organization-wide risk management program primarily to ensure that the
Company is effectively managing its risks. In contrast, in the case of a ceremonial RMP
the board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk
management program primarily to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with
regulations (e.g., SEC, 2010; NYSE, 2013). The high financial risk case requires a large
financial investment (relative to other project investments), and the low financial risk
case requires a small financial investment (relative to other project investments).
Factors Affecting Participants’ Recommendations
The first additional question asked participants the extent that certain factors (i.e.,
board of directors’ attitude toward risk management, top managements’ attitude toward
risk management, the employee appointed in charge of risk oversight, internal audit’s
level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program, and the relative size of the project
investment) affected their recommendation about whether the Company should make the
project investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal effect, 50
represents moderate effect, and 100 represents significant effect).
Extent Participants Felt Accountable to Board and Top Management
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The second additional question asked participants to what extent they felt
accountable to (1) the board of directors and (2) top management for the risk associated
with their recommendation about whether the Company should make the project
investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal accountability,
50 represents moderate accountability, and 100 represents significant accountability).
Extent Participants Believed the Board and Top Management are Risk Averse
The third additional question asked participants to indicate the extent that they
believe (1) the board of directors and (2) top management are risk averse based on a
sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal risk aversion, 50 represents moderate
risk aversion, and 100 represents significant risk aversion).
Perceived Level of Risk for this Project Investment
The fourth additional question asked participants to indicate the level of risk for
this project investment based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents low risk, 50
represents moderate risk, and 100 represents high risk).
Extent Participants Believed the Board and Top Management Supported the Company’s
ERM Program
The fifth additional question asked participants to indicate the extent they believe
(1) the board of directors and (2) top management support the Company’s ERM program
based on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents minimal support, 50 represents
moderate support, and 100 represents significant support).
Manipulation Check Questions
The participants were then asked two manipulation check questions to determine
whether they were able to identify the correct RMP type and the correct financial risk
level in which they were randomly assigned. The RMP type manipulation check question

40

asked participants to indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its
ERM program based on the facts in the case. The correct response for the robust RMP
was “to ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks.” The correct response
for the ceremonial RMP was “to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with
SEC and NYSE regulations.” The financial risk level manipulation check question asked
participants to indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case. The correct
response for the high financial risk level was “large” and the correct response for the low
financial risk level was “small.”
Realistic and Understandable Case
Next participants were asked to indicate how realistic this case was on a sliding
scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very unrealistic, 50 represents moderately realistic, 100
very realistic) and how understandable this case was on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0
represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents moderately understandable, and 100
represents very understandable).
Participants’ ERM and Project Investment Experience
Participants were then asked about their career experience working with ERM
programs. Those participants answering “yes” to the question about whether they have
had any experience with a risk management program in their career were then asked what
the primary focus of the RMP(s) they experienced on the basis of a sliding scale from 0
to 100 (0 represents primarily compliance-based ERM focus, or a ceremonial RMP, and
100 represents primarily risk-based ERM focus, or a robust RMP).
Participants were also asked to indicate whether they have had any professional
experience in making project investment recommendations or decisions in their career.
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Those responding “yes” were then asked (using a sliding scale from 0 to 100) to indicate
the extent of such experience (0 represents minimal experience, 50 represents moderate
experience, and 100 represents significant experience) and the degree such experience
has been favorable (0 represents very unfavorable and 100 represents very favorable).
Individual Participants’ General Risk-Taking Propensities
Based on the Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk Taking Index, participants were then
asked to indicate the frequency that six general risk-taking situations not related to the
specific case study have ever applied to them now or in their adult past based on a 5point scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = occasionally, 4 = often, and 5 = very often).
Therefore, participants made a total of 12 responses to measure their general risk-taking
propensities to be used as a possible control variable.
Demographic Data and Invitation to Drawing
The experiment concluded with a series of questions related to participant
demographic data, additional participant thoughts about the case, and whether
participants would like to receive by email a summary report of survey responses, as well
as an invitation to enter into a drawing for a gift certificate.
Independent Variables
The study includes two categorical independent variables of interest: (1) RMP
type (robust or ceremonial) and (2) financial risk level (high or low).
RMP (robust). In the experiment the expressed purpose of a robust RMP is
primarily to ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks. As such, a robust
RMP receives strong support from the board of directors and top management, who are
willing to expend the required resources to ensure that it is properly implemented. A
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robust RMP is also characterized by appointing someone to assume risk oversight
responsibilities (e.g., a CRO) who has specialized risk management experience and
regularly conducts specific risk management meetings and generates risk reports, as well
as regular internal audit ERM evaluation.
In practice a robust RMP is a fully functioning, integrated ERM program, as
described in COSO (2004). Specifically, a robust RMP has the support of senior
management (including the CEO, CFO) and the board (especially the audit committee),
has regular and productive CRO-led executive and board risk management sessions, and
is subject to regular evaluation of the effectiveness of organization-wide risk
management by a competent internal audit function. These attributes of a robust RMP
were derived from the literature. Specifically, senior management and board support, as
well as the presence of a CRO, have been positively related to ERM implementation
(Beasley et al., 2005). Additionally, the presence of a CRO has been used as a proxy for
ERM adoption (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Pagach & Warr, 2011). Furthermore, a more
complete ERM has been found to have the greatest impact in internal audit activities
(Beasley et al., 2008). In addition, recent audit surveys (e.g., IIA, 2010; PwC, 2011) have
identified risk management as a new focus of the internal audit function.
RMP (ceremonial). In the experiment the expressed purpose of a ceremonial RMP
is primarily to demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with regulations (e.g.,
NYSE, 2013; SEC, 2010; COSO, 2004). As such, a ceremonial RMP lacks any real
support from the board of directors and top management, who are unwilling to expend
resources to implement a RMP that effectively manages the Company’s risks. A
ceremonial RMP is also characterized by appointing someone to assume risk oversight
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responsibilities (e.g., the controller) who lacks specialized risk management experience
and does not conduct specific risk management meetings or generate risk reports, as well
as the lack of internal audit ERM evaluation.
In practice a ceremonial RMP is primarily a symbolic, disjointed risk
management program that is more of a ritualistic process to create the appearance of
legitimacy rather than to effectively manage organizational risks. It has no or very limited
senior management and board support. Additionally, it has no or sporadic and marginally
effective risk sessions or reports, a CRO or other employee appointed in charge of risk
management with no or limited ERM experience or access to senior management and the
board, and no or very little IA focus on the effectiveness of the RMP. These
characterizations of a ceremonial RMP are consistent with institutional theory (Kalbers &
Fogarty, 1998).
Financial risk level (high). In the experiment a high financial risk level is
represented by a capital budgeting decision for a new product introduction that requires a
large financial investment (relative to other project investments). Additionally, missing
the Company’s minimum required return on relatively large investments significantly
impacts the Company’s ability to meet its overall profitability goals. In the experiment
the new product introduction (manufacturing of swift-cook ovens) would be funded
through internal funds and not through the issuance of debt. Therefore, the financial risk
level is not influenced by assuming more debt, but only through the relative required size
of the financial investment. In this study, I intentionally manipulated only the size of the
required financial investment for the financial risk level, because simultaneously
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increasing the Company’s debt for the high financial risk condition may have resulted in
extreme conservative judgments.
Academic literature indicates that high financial risk is characterized by
organizational risk decisions with significant financial impact (e.g., Schlenker &
Weigold, 1989) and relatively higher financial leverage (e.g., Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003)
with associated debt covenant restrictions. First, risk decisions with significant financial
impact represent accountability triangle events that have more important consequences
for the decision maker (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) and thus are properly associated
with a high financial risk. Second, Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) found that firms that
appoint CROs (proxy for ERM) had greater financial leverage. In this case the CRO
appointment was believed to offset the increased risk associated with a higher ratio of
debt to equity (i.e., greater financial leverage). Higher levels of debt increase risk because
debt must be repaid even if earnings or cash flows go down.
Financial risk level (low). In the experiment a low financial risk level is
represented by a capital budgeting decision for a new product introduction that requires a
small financial investment (relative to other project investments). Additionally, missing
the Company’s minimum required return on relatively large investments modestly
impacts the Company’s ability to meet its overall profitability goals. In the experiment
the new product introduction (manufacturing of swift-cook ovens) would be funded
through internal funds and not through the issuance of debt. Therefore, the financial risk
level is not influenced by assuming more debt, but only through the relative required size
of the financial investment. In this study, I intentionally manipulated only the size of the
required financial investment for the financial risk level, because simultaneously
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increasing the Company’s debt for the high financial risk condition may have resulted in
extreme conservative judgments.
Academic literature indicates that low financial risk includes organizational risk
decisions with less financial impact (e.g., Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) and lower
financial leverage (e.g., Lienbenberg & Hoyt, 2003) with few debt covenant restrictions.
These low risk traits represent the opposite of the high financial risk level traits (i.e., low
versus high financial impact and lower versus higher financial leverage) discussed earlier
under the high financial risk condition.
In addition to the manipulated independent variables, I consider several possible
control variables, including participants’ general risk-taking propensities, gender, years of
professional experience, current title, professional certifications, education (highest
degree), industry, company size, and early vs. later responders.
Dependent Variables
The two primary continuous dependent variables in this study are (1) financial
professional judgment conservatism and (2) financial professional judgment effort.
Financial professional judgment conservatism is measured on a sliding scale from 0 to
100 related to the likelihood that participants would recommend that the Company make
a financial investment in a new product introduction with a potential financial upside
(reward) and financial downside (risk). Financial professional judgment effort is
measured on two sliding scales each from 0 to 100 related to relatively (1) how much
time it would take and (2) the extent of consultation the participant would seek to make
the project investment recommendation. Participants were then asked to describe the
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factors they considered in their judgment responses, and to indicate the individual(s) they
would consult.
Primary Variable 1: Financial Manager Judgment Conservatism
(CONSERVATISM)
Participants were asked to evaluate a project investment opportunity and
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows:
As a financial manager charged with evaluating and making
recommendations about whether the Company should pursue
project investment opportunities, please slide the bar below to
indicate the likelihood you would recommend that the Company
make the financial investment to manufacture the new swift-cook
oven (0 = Not at all likely, 50 = Moderately likely, 100 = Very
likely).
Primary Variable 2a: Financial Manager Judgment Effort (EFFORT)
Participants were asked relatively how much time they would take to
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows:
Please slide the bar below to indicate how much time you would
take to develop a recommendation for this project investment
relative to a typical project investment recommendation (0 = Much
less time, 50 = About average time, 100 = Much more time).
Primary Variable 2b: Financial Manager Judgment Effort (EFFORT)
Participants were asked the extent that they would consult with others to
recommend whether the Company make a financial investment as follows:
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Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you would
consult with others to develop a recommendation for this project
investment relative to a typical project investment recommendation
(0 = Much less consultation, 50 = About average consultation, 100
= Much more consultation).
The use of a sliding scale from 0 to 100 to measure these primary judgments is common
in the accounting literature for these types of studies (e.g., DeZoort et al. 2003, 2008).
Control Variables
In this study, I consider several potential covariates as possible control variables
including general risk-taking propensity (the Data Analysis and Results section includes
more information on possible control variables). The general risk-taking propensity
variable identified an overall risk-taking score for each participant based on their
responses to 12 questions related to six general risk-taking situations that comprise “The
Risk Taking Index” used by Nicholson et al. (2005). This Risk Taking Index is a scale
used to assess an individual’s overall risk propensity related to reported frequency of risk
behaviors in six domains. The results of structural equation modeling of the Risk Taking
Index supports that the six factor model is superior to other models (i.e., single factor,
two factor, and six-factor plus a second order overall factor), is more parsimonious with
desirable goodness of fit, and has high internal consistency for the general propensity
scale (Cronbach’s alpha 0.80) (Nicholson et al., 2005). The Risk Taking Index is a short,
simple measure of risk-taking with high face validity that was developed by asking
people about risk behaviors in several common life experiences in which many people
would be exposed to risk. Evidence from risk literature indicates that some psychological
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constructs can be effectively measured with short questionnaires (Robins et al., 2001).
Nicholson et al. (2005) found that risk propensity is related to age, sex, measures of
career risk-taking, and personality. The Risk Taking Index questions appear below
(Nicholson et al., 2005: 174):
Please could you tell us if any of the following have ever applied to you, now or
in your adult past? Please use the scales as follows:
1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = occasionally, 4 = often, 5 = very often
Now
Recreational risks (e.g., rock-climbing, scuba diving) 1 2 3 4 5

In the Past
12345

Health risks (e.g., smoking, poor diet, high alcohol
consumption)

12345

12345

Career risks (e.g., quitting a job without another to
go to)

12345

12345

Financial risks (e.g., gambling, risky investments)

12345

12345

Safety risks (e.g., fast driving, cycling without
a helmet)

12345

12345

Social risks (e.g., standing for election, publically
challenging a rule or decision)

12345

12345

Model
Based on the above discussion of the independent, dependent, and possible
control variables, I use the following MANOVA model to test my hypotheses (followed
by individual ANCOVAs for judgment conservatism and judgment effort separately):
(CONSERVATISM, EFFORT) = F (RMP TYPE1, FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL2,
RMP TYPE X FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL, Possible Control Variables3)
1

ROBUST RMP, CEREMONIAL RMP

2

HIGH FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL, LOW FINANCIAL RISK LEVEL
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I consider variables including GENDER, YEARS OF PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE, RMP EXPERIENCE, PROJECT INVEST EXPERIENCE,
CURRENT TITLE, PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS, EDUCATION,
INDUSTRY SEGMENT, REVENUE OF EMPLOYER, EARLY OR LATE
RESPONDERS, GENERAL RISK-TAKING PROPENSITY.

Participants
The study’s participants were a sample of experienced financial professionals.
The study received a competitive research grant from the Institute of Management
Accountants (IMA), which has over 70,000 worldwide members. Three email requests
with a link to the experiment were sent by the IMA Research Director to approximately
5,000 IMA members with at least 5 years of professional experience and employed in
U.S. manufacturing companies. These criteria were necessary because my experimental
case involved a manufacturing company, and the participants needed a high level of
experience to make some complex case judgments. Sample copies of the email requests
sent to IMA members appear in Appendix A. In addition, I sent an email request with a
link to the experiment to a group of experienced accounting alumni from the University
of Scranton to increase the response. Email requests with a link to the experiment were
sent in November and December 2014. A total of 88 completed experiments were
received: 71 completed experiments from the IMA members and 17 completed
experiments from the University of Scranton accounting alumni. Excluding three
responses that each indicated over 8 hours to complete (apparently these participants
started the survey and completed it at a later time), the mean completion time for the
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remaining 85 completed experiments was 26.5 minutes. Fully completed experiments for
each of the four cells in the 2 x 2 experimental design are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Fully Completed Experiments (88 Total Participants)

Robust Risk Management Program
(Risk-Based)
Ceremonial Risk Management Program
(Compliance-Based)

High Financial Risk
(Relatively Large
Investment Size)
26 Participants

Low Financial Risk
(Relatively Small
Investment Size)
23 Participants

18 Participants

21 Participants

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
All of the 88 participants were presented with two manipulation check questions
to determine whether the participants could identify into which experimental conditions
they were randomly assigned. The participants were asked to answer the manipulation
check questions without referring back to prior screens in the online instrument.
The first manipulation check question related to the RMP program type (robust or
ceremonial) as follows:
Please indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its ERM
program based on the facts of the case:
o To ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks
o To demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with SEC and NYSE
regulations
The second manipulation check question related to the financial risk level (high or low),
as reflected by the relative size of the project investment (large or small) as follows:
Please indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case:
o Large
o Small
The order of the response choices was randomized for each participant.
Out of 88 participants who completed experiments, 26 participants (or 29.5%)
failed the RMP program type manipulation check, and 5 participants (or 5.7%) failed the
financial risk level manipulation check. Overall, 60 participants (or 68.2%) passed both
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manipulation checks. This manipulation check pass rate is consistent with some other
accounting studies that targeted experienced professionals (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003,
2008). The reason for the higher manipulation check failure rate for the RMP program
type (29.5%) than for the financial risk level (5.7%) may be attributable to the fact that in
practice an actual RMP may exhibit some characteristics of both a robust RMP and a
ceremonial RMP. Table 4 shows the random distribution among the four experimental
cells of the 60 participants who fully completed the instrument and passed all
manipulation checks. The number of responses for each cell is consistent with some
previous accounting studies (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2003, 2008).
Table 4: Fully Completed and Passed All Manipulation Checks (60 Total Participants)

Robust Risk Management Program
(Risk-Based)
Ceremonial Risk Management Program
(Compliance-Based)

High Financial Risk
(Relatively Large
Investment Size)
14 Participants

Low Financial Risk
(Relatively Small
Investment Size)
14 Participants

17 Participants

15 Participants

Sample Size and Missing Data
As many as three of the 60 participants who completed and passed all
manipulation checks failed to respond to questions measuring certain dependent
variables. Therefore, the N for particular dependent variables ranges from 57 to 60
(details provided in each table below).
Realistic and Understandable Case
Two questions were asked to measure the participants’ perceptions about the case
realism and understandability. The first question asked participants to indicate how
realistic this case was on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very unrealistic, 50
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represents moderately realistic, and 100 represents very realistic). As shown in Table 5,
the 60 participants perceived the case to be realistic (mean of REALISTIC = 67.65, SD of
19.16; only two participants rated lower than 25 and seven rated lower than 50). The
second question asked participants to indicate how understandable the case was on a
sliding scale from 0 to 100 (0 represents very difficult to understand, 50 represents
moderately understandable, and 100 represents very understandable). The 60 participants
perceived the case to be understandable (mean of UNDERSTANDABLE = 76.07, SD
15.10; no participants scored lower than 25 and only 3 participants scored lower than 50).
Table 5: Realistic and Understandable Case 0-100 Scale Variables

Description of Scaled Variables
Indicate how realistic this case was:
0 = Very unrealistic
50 = Moderately realistic
100 = Very realistic
Indicate how understandable this case was:
0 = Very difficult to understand
50 = Moderately understandable
100 = Very understandable

n

Mean

S.D.

60 67.65 19.16

60 76.07 15.10

Demographics
Demographic information for the 60 participants is presented in Table 6 below.
More males (43 or 71.7%) participated in the experiment than females (17 or 28.3%).
Participants had significant professional experience, with 55 participants (91.7%) having
more than 15 years of professional business experience, and had specialized career
experience relevant to the case, with 41 participants (68.3%) having experience with risk
management programs and 47 participants (74.6%) having experience making project
investment decisions. Current titles indicate that participants were mostly financial
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managers (13 or 21.7%), controllers (10 or 16.7%), external auditors (6 or 10.0%), and
CFOs (5 or 8.3%), with several business owners, presidents, and vice-presidents included
in the “other” category. Participants worked mostly for public companies (21 or 35.0%),
private for-profit companies (21 or 35.0%), and public accounting firms (11 or 18.3%),
and they worked mainly for employers with large revenues (23 participants or 39.0%
worked for employers with revenues of more than $1 billion, and 54 participants or
90.0% worked for employers with revenues of $10 million or more). Fifty-one (or 85.0%)
of participants had at least one professional accounting or finance certification (32
participants or 53.3% were CMAs and 27 participants or 45.0% were CPAs), and the
participants were well educated, with the participants’ highest degree being a Bachelor’s
(29 or 48.3%), Master’s (29 or 48.3%), Law (1 or 1.7%), and Doctorate (1 or 1.7%).
Table 6: Demographic Information
Gender
Total Years of Professional
Business Experience

Experience with Risk
Management Program in
Career?
Experience Making Project
Investment Decisions in
Career?
Current Title

Business Segment

Male
Female
Less than 5 years
5 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
Over 25 years
Yes
No

43
17
3
3
2
13
13
26
41
19

71.7%
28.3%
5.0%
5.0%
3.3%
21.7%
21.7%
43.3%
68.3%
31.7%

Yes
No

47
11

74.6%
17.5%

Financial Manager
Controller
External Auditor
Chief Financial Officer
Assistant Controller
Staff Accountant
Other Professional
Public Company

13
10
6
5
4
3
19
21

21.7%
16.7%
10.0%
8.3%
6.7%
5.0%
31.7%
35.0%
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Annual Revenue of Your
Employer

Professional Certifications

Highest Educational Degree

Private For-Profit Company
Public Accounting
Not-For-Profit
Other
Less than $10 million
$10 million to $100 million
$101 million to $500 million
$501 million to $1 billion
More than $1 billion
CMA
CPA
CFA
Other
None
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Law Degree
Doctoral Degree (e.g., Ph.D.,
DBA)

21
11
3
4
6
13
13
4
23
32
27
2
13
9
29
29
1
1

35.0%
18.3%
5.0%
6.7%
10.2%
22.0%
22.0%
6.8%
39.0%
53.3%
45.0%
3.3%
21.7%
15.0%
48.3%
48.3%
1.7%
1.7%

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics and independent samples test are presented in Tables 7, 8, 9,
10, and 11 below.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables:
DV#1:
Recommend
Invest

Independent Variables:
Robust RMP
(Risk-Based)
Ceremonial RMP
(Compliance-Based)
High Financial Risk
(Relatively Large
Investment Size)
Low Financial Risk

N
Mean
S.D.
N
Mean
S.D.
N
Mean
S.D
N

28
40.64
21.03
32
39.63
22.31
31
37.71
22.13
29

DV#2a:
Relative
Time to
Recommend
27
61.19
20.47
32
63.09
18.45
31
69.23
19.74
28

DV#2b:
Relative
Extent of
Consultation
25
70.04
20.29
32
71.22
18.04
30
75.83
21.09
27
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(Relatively Small
Investment Size)

Mean
S.D.

42.66
20.99

54.46
15.64

65.00
14.45

Table 7 above shows the N, Mean, and S.D. for the primary dependent variables
(i.e., recommend invest, relative time to recommend, and relative extent of consultation)
related to the two individual independent variables: RMP type (robust or ceremonial) and
financial risk level (high or low). Table 8 presents the same information by experimental
cell, and Table 9 presents the results of t-tests by condition.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics – By Experimental Cell
Dependent Variables:
DV#1:
Recommend
Invest

Independent Variables:
Cell 1: Robust RMP and
High Financial Risk
Cell 2: Robust RMP and
Low Financial Risk
Cell 3: Ceremonial RMP
and
High Financial Risk
Cell 4: Ceremonial RMP
and
Low Financial Risk

n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D.
n
Mean
S.D
n
Mean
S.D.

14
41.71
19.36
14
39.57
23.27
17
34.41
24.25
15
45.53
18.96

DV#2a:
Relative
Time to
Recommend
14
68.86
21.01
13
52.92
16.93
17
69.53
19.28
15
55.80
14.90

DV#2b:
Relative
Extent of
Consultation
13
71.85
24.85
12
68.08
14.73
17
78.88
17.89
15
62.53
14.24

Table 9: Independent Samples Test
Independent
Variables
Robust/Ceremonial RMP

High/Low Financial Risk

Dependent
Variables
Recommend Invest
Time to Recommend
Extent of Consultation
Recommend Invest
Time to Recommend

T-test for Equality of
Group Means
p-value (2-tailed)

0.857
0.708
0.818
0.379
0.003*

57
Extent of Consultation

0.029*

*T-test indicates a significant difference in the means of the DV for pvalue at the 0.05 level.

In Table 7, the mean scores for the likelihood that participants would recommend
that the Company make the case project investment of 40.64 for a robust RMP versus
39.63 for a ceremonial RMP, and 37.71 for a relatively large investment size versus 42.66
for a relatively small investment size, overall appear to reflect participant judgment
conservatism. In addition, the S.D. ranging from 20.99 to 22.31 appears to indicate
relatively high variability among individual participants about whether the Company
should make the project investment.
The mean scores for how much time it would take to make the case project
investment recommendation (relative to a typical project investment) of 61.19 for a
robust RMP versus 63.09 for a ceremonial RMP appear comparable; however, the mean
score of 69.23 for a relatively high investment size is 14.77 points higher than the mean
score of 54.46 for a relatively low investment size. This difference shows that
participants would take more time (i.e., effort) to make recommendations for projects of
relatively higher investment size (see Table 9; p = 0.003 for this difference).
Additionally, the S.D. ranging from 15.64 to 20.47 again indicates notable individual
participant variability. Similarly, the second dependent variable measuring judgment
effort, relative extent of consultation, has comparable mean scores of 70.04 for a robust
RMP and 71.22 for a ceremonial RMP; however, it also has a 10.83 higher mean score of
75.83 for a relatively large investment size versus the mean score of 65.00 for a relatively
small investment size, which once again reflects greater judgment effort (i.e., extent of
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consultation) associated a relatively higher investment size (see Table 9; p = 0.029 for
this difference). In this case, individual participant judgment variability is reflected in a
S.D. ranging from 14.45 to 21.09.
In summary, Tables 7-9 indicate comparable judgment conservatism mean scores
related to RMP type and relative investment size, and comparable judgment effort mean
scores related to RMP type, but notably higher judgment effort mean scores for relative
investment size (i.e., financial risk level).
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics – General Risk-Taking Propensity Scale (n = 60)
Response Ratings of 12 Risk-Taking
Situation Questions Unrelated to Case
Mean for Responses Mean for Responses
to All 12
to Individual 12
Questions
Questions
Participant RiskTaking
Propensity Rating

26.62
(S.D. 7.16)

2.22

Risk-Taking
Activities
Applied Now or
in Your Adult Past
1-5 Scale Anchors
1 = Never
2 = Rarely
3 = Occasionally
4 = Often
5 = Very Often

Note: General Risk-Taking Propensity Scale is based on Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk
Taking Index.

Table 10 above indicates the N, Mean, and S.D. for the risk-taking propensity
scale. A mean of 26.62 (S.D. 7.16) is reported for the responses to all 12 questions about
whether each of the scale’s six general risk-taking situations unrelated to the case applied
to participants now or in their adult past (Nicholson et al., 2005). The mean for responses
to individual 12 questions of 2.22 falls between the scale anchors “2 = Rarely” and “3 =
Occasionally.” Because the case instrument asked participants to make a judgment
involving different levels of financial risk (i.e., a relatively large versus a relatively small
project investment size), I used participants’ general risk-taking propensity mean scores
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for responses to all 12 questions from the Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk Taking Index as a
control variable. However, as discussed below (Table 16), controlling for participants’
general risk-taking propensity did not affect the results of the study.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics – Other 0-100 Scale Variables

Extent the following factors affected your
recommendation about whether the Company should
make the project investment:
Relative size of investment project
Top managements’ attitude toward risk management
Board of directors’ attitude toward risk management
The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight
Internal audit’s level of evaluation of the Company’s
ERM program
Extent you feel accountable to below parties for risk
associated with recommendation about whether the
Company should make the project investment:
Top management
Board of directors

Std.
0-100 Scale
Deviation Anchors

N

Mean

60
59
59
59

75.10
66.37
64.25
54.85

21.53
20.91
22.67
25.11

59

47.95

26.59

0 = Minimal
50 = Moderate
100 = Significant

60
60

81.13
69.48

13.95
25.66

0 = Minimal
50 = Moderate
100 = Significant

0 = Minimal
50 = Moderate
100 = Significant

Extent that you believe the below parties are risk
averse:
Top management
Board of directors

60
60

59.00
51.38

23.28
21.00

Level of risk for this project investment

60

66.13

20.65

Extent that you believe the below parties support
Company’s ERM program:
Board of directors
Top management

60
60

61.03
52.82

28.39
30.74

Primary focus of the risk management program(s)
you have experienced in your career

41

59.00

23.99

0 = Low
50 = Moderate
100 = High

0 = Minimal
50 = Moderate
100 = Significant
0 = Primarily
compliancebased
100 = Primarily
risk-based
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Extent of your professional experience in making
project investment recommendations or decisions

Degree that your overall experience in making
project investment recommendations or decisions
has been favorable

49

49

71.35

75.16

19.47

14.67

0 = Minimal
50 = Moderate
100 = Significant
0 = Very
unfavorable
100 = Very
favorable

Table 11 above provides the N, Mean, S.D., and scale anchors for other 0 – 100
scale variables in order of the highest to lowest mean score for each variable. Factors that
participants indicated most affected their recommendations about whether the Company
should make the project investment were the relative size of the investment project (mean
of 75.10, S.D. of 21.53), top managements’ attitude toward risk management (mean of
66.37, S.D. of 20.91), and the board of directors’ attitude toward risk management (mean
of 64.25, S.D. of 22.67). The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight (mean of
54.85, S.D. of 25.11) had a moderate effect on participants’ recommendations, and
internal audit’s level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program (mean of 47.95, S.D.
of 26.59) had a similar effect.
Participants felt most accountable to top management for risk associated with
their recommendation about whether the Company should make the project investment
(mean of 81.13) and less accountable but still well above moderately accountable to the
board of directors (mean of 69.48). In contrast, participants believed that the board of
directors is more (t-test revealed significantly different means, p = 0.000) risk averse
(mean of 59.00) than top management (mean of 51.28) and that the board of directors
supports the Company’s ERM program (mean of 61.03) more (t-test revealed
significantly different means, p = 0.000) than top management (mean of 52.82).
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Participants also perceived moderate/high risk for the case project investment (mean of
66.13).
Participants were also asked whether they had any experience in their careers (1)
working with a risk management program and (2) making project investment
recommendations or decisions. The 41 participants with risk management program career
experience were presented with the following:
The focus of ERM programs varies among organizations. Some organizations
merely focus on compliance with regulations (i.e., a compliance-based ERM
focus), while other organizations also focus on effectively managing risks (i.e., a
risk-based ERM focus). Please slide the bar below to indicate the primary focus of
the risk management program(s) you have experienced in your career (0 =
Primarily compliance-based ERM focus, 100 = Primarily risk-based ERM focus).
Participants’ response mean of 59.00 (S.D. of 23.99) is consistent with risk management
interview studies (e.g., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) that support the existence of a
compliance-based ERM focus (i.e., a ceremonial RMP from an institutional theory
perspective) and a risk-based ERM focus (i.e., a robust RMP from an agency theory
perspective) in practice. The practical relevance of both robust RMPs and ceremonial
RMPs is strengthened further after considering that responding participants are financial
professionals with career experience working with risk management program(s) and that
the response mean (i.e., 59.00) is fairly close to the 0-100 scale mid-point of 50.
However, a t-test indicates that the mean of 59.00 is significantly (p = 0.021) different
from the 50.00 mid-point. The 41 participants’ responses included 24 primarily riskbased (greater than the 50.00 scale mid-point), 4 neutral (at the 50.00 scale mid-point)
and 13 primarily compliance-based (less than the 50.00 scale mid-point).
The 49 participants with career experience making project investment
recommendations or decisions reported (1) a mean of 71.35 (S.D. of 19.47) for the extent
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of such experience, and (2) a mean of 75.16 (S.D. 14.67) for the degree that such
experience has been favorable, which indicates overall favorable (and perhaps successful)
participant experience in this area.
MANOVA Results
The study model includes multiple continuous 0-100 scale dependent variables
(RECOMMEND INVEST, TIME TO RECOMMEND, EXTENT OF
CONSULTATION) and nominal independent variables (RMP Type, Invest Size). The
three dependent variables reflect different dimensions of an investment decision. In
addition, dependent variables TIME TO RECOMMEND and EXTENT OF
CONSULTATION are correlated (Pearson Correlation = .781, p-value = 0.000). As a
result, I used MANOVA to assess the overall relationships. 1
The MANOVA model is:
[Judgment Conservatism (Likelihood You Recommend Invest), Judgment
Effort (Relative Time to Recommend, Relative Extent of Consultation)] =
f (RMP Type, Investment Size, RMP Type X Investment Size)
Table 12 below presents the results of the MANOVA.
Table 12: MANOVA Model Results
Judgment Conservatism (Likelihood You Recommend Invest), Judgment Effort (Relative
Time to Recommend, Relative Extent of Consultation) = f (RMP Type, Investment Size,
RMP Type X Investment Size)
(n = 57)

1

Effect
Model

F

RMP Type

.058

Sig.
0.096**
0.982

As discussed below (see Table 16), numerous control variables were considered, but they do not affect the
conclusions.
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Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment Size

3.128
1.769

0.034*
0.165

***Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10
level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
Note: Wilk’s Lambda results are reported in table.
The MANOVA model is marginally significant (p-value = 0.096) and investment size is
significant (F = 3.128, p-value = 0.034).2 Observed power for the three dependent
variables (recommend invest, time to recommend, extent of consultation) is 1.00, which
exceeds the typical 0.80 benchmark (e.g., UCLA, 2015). Based on the MANOVA results,
none of the four pre-study hypotheses are supported because RMP type and the
interaction of RMP type and investment size are not significant. Specifically, the RMP
type (i.e., robust or ceremonial), and the interaction of the RMP type and the investment
size (i.e., relatively large or small), failed to significantly affect the likelihood that the
study participants would recommend that the Company make the case project investment.
Only the investment size is significant. Chapter 5 offers possible reasons for and
implications of these results. The results of ANOVAs related to the primary and other
dependent variables are discussed next.
ANOVAs Related to Primary Dependent Variables
I next use individual ANOVAs for judgment conservatism (recommend invest),
judgment effort (time to invest), and judgment effort (extent of consultation). Table 13
below presents that the ANOVA model for judgment conservatism (recommend invest) is
not significant (F = 0.732, p-value = 0.537, adjusted R-squared = 0.014), nor are any of

2

Results are similar if those failing a manipulation check are included (n = 84 due to missing data), except
that the model is p = 0.006. Investment size is significant at p < 0.001.
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the individual independent variables (RMP type, investment size, RMP type X
investment size) significantly related to judgment conservatism. Therefore, Hypotheses
H1 (i.e., financial professionals of companies with a robust RMP will make more
conservative financial investment business decisions than financial professionals with a
ceremonial RMP) and H3 (i.e., the effect of robust RMP on financial investment
judgment conservatism is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the
level of financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA results. These results are
consistent with the MANOVA results presented earlier.
Table 13 – ANOVA Results (Judgment Conservatism)
DV = Likelihood You Would Recommend to Make Financial Investment
(n = 60)

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type
Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment
Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

3
1
1
1

Mean
Square
344.421
96872.117
6.697
300.421

F
0.732
205.828
0.014
0.638

Sig.
0.537
0.000
0.905
0.428

1

655.661

1.393

0.243

56
60
59

470.645

df

R Squared = 0.038 (Adjusted R Squared = -0.014)

Table 14 below shows that the ANOVA model for judgment effort (time to
invest) is significant (F = 3.286, p-value = 0.027, adjusted R-squared = 0.106). However,
the individual independent variables RMP type and the interaction of RMP type and
investment size are not significantly related to judgment effort (relative time to invest).
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Therefore, hypotheses H2 (i.e., financial professionals of companies with a robust RMP
will exert more effort while making financial investment business decisions than
financial professionals of companies with a ceremonial RMP) and H4 (i.e., the effect of
robust RMP on financial investment judgment effort is greater when the level of financial
risk is high than when the level of financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA
results. However, a significant relationship (F = 9.695, p-value = 0.003) was found
between investment size and judgment effort (relative time to invest), with a 0 – 100
scale judgment effort (relative time to invest) mean of 69.23 (S.D. of 19.74, N. of 31) for
the relatively large investment condition and a corresponding mean of 54.46 (S.D. of
15.64, N. of 28) for the relatively small investment condition. These results are consistent
with the MANOVA results presented earlier. It appears that neither RMP type nor
investment size effects participants’ judgment conservatism, and only investment size has
any significant effect on participants’ judgment effort.
Table 14: ANOVA Results (Judgment Effort – Relative Time to Invest)
DV = Relative Time You Would Take to Develop a Recommendation
(n = 59)
Mean
Source
df
Square
F
Sig.
Corrected Model
3
1088.954
3.286
0.027**
Intercept
1 222986.995 672.780
0.000
RMP Type
1
46.000
0.139
0.711
Investment Size
1
3213.249
9.695
0.003*
RMP Type * Investment
1
17.749
0.054
0.818
Size
Error
55
331.441
Total
59
Corrected Total
58
R Squared = 0.152 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.106)
**Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
* Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
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Table 15 below indicates that the ANOVA model for judgment effort (extent of
consultation) is marginally significant (F = 2.227, p-value = 0.096, adjusted R-squared =
0.062). However, the individual independent variables RMP type and the interaction of
RMP type and investment size are not significantly related to judgment effort (relative
extent of consultation). Therefore, once again hypotheses H2 (i.e., financial professionals
of companies with a robust RMP will exert more effort while making financial
investment business decisions than financial professionals of companies with a
ceremonial RMP) and H4 (i.e., the effect of robust RMP on financial investment
judgment effort is greater when the level of financial risk is high than when the level of
financial risk is low) are not supported by the ANOVA results. However, a significant
relationship (F =- 4.226, p-value = 0.045) was found between investment size and
judgment effort (relative extent of consultation), with a 0 – 100 scale judgment effort
(relative extent of consultation) mean of 75.83 (S.D. of 21.09, N. of 30) for the relatively
large investment condition and a corresponding mean of 65.00 (S.D. of 14.52, N. of 27)
for the relatively small investment condition. These ANOVA results for judgment effort
(relative extent of consultation) are consistent with the MANOVA results and the
ANOVA results for judgment effort (relative time to invest) presented earlier.
Table 15 ANOVA Results (Judgment Effort – Relative Extent of Consultation)
DV = Relative Extent that You Would Consult with Others to Develop Recommendation
(n = 57)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type

Mean
df
Square
3
745.941
1 277011.537
1
7.730

F
2.227
826.942
0.023

Sig.
0.096**
0.000
0.880
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Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment
Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

1

1415.541

4.226

0.045*

1

554.381

1.655

0.204

53
57
56

334.983

R Squared = 0.112 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.062)
**Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.

Table 16 below lists possible control variables considered in this study. Adding
each of these possible control variables one at a time to the MANOVA model did not
change the significance of any relationships between the independent variables (1) RMP
type, (2) investment size, or (3) the interaction between RMP type and investment size
and the primary dependent variables (1) judgment conservatism (likelihood to
recommend making the project investment) and (2) judgment effort (relative time and
relative extent of consultation to make recommendation). Therefore, the final MANOVA
model excluded these possible control variables. The list of possible control variables
were derived from common control variables used in accounting experiments (e.g.,
gender, years of professional experience, current title, professional certifications,
education, industry segment, revenue of employer) and variables specific to this study
(i.e., RMP program experience, project investment experience, early or late responders,
and general risk-taking propensity).
TABLE 16: List of Possible Control Variables
Variable Name
Gender

Description
Male or female
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Years of professional
experience
RMP program experience
Project investment
experience
Current title

Professional certifications
Education
Industry segment

Revenue of employer

Early or late responders
General risk-taking
propensity

Measured in years
Yes or no
Yes or no
Current job title (i.e., CFO, Financial Manager,
Controller, Assistant Controller, Staff Accountant,
External Auditor, Internal Auditor, Other)
Professional certifications (i.e., CMA, CPA, CFA, Other,
None)
Highest educational degree (i.e., Bachelor’s, Master’s,
Law, Doctoral)
Segment currently work (i.e., public company, private
for-profit company, not-for-profit, government, public
accounting, other)
Approximate annual revenue of employer (i.e., less than
$10 million, $10 million to $100 million, $101 million to
$500 million, $501 million to $1 billion, more than $1
billion)
Participants completing instrument earlier or later
Participants’ individual general risk-taking propensity
overall score based on Nicholson et al. (2005) Risk
Taking Index scale

In summary, the ANOVA results do not support H1, H2, H3, or H4. There is no
evidence that RMP type affects investment decisions or related effort, nor is there any
evidence of an interaction between RMP type and investment size. However, a significant
relationship, not previously hypothesized, between the investment size and judgment
effort (measured separately by relative time and extent of consultation) was revealed.
Investment size appears to affect the level judgment effort, but not the level of judgment
conservatism, while RMP type appears to have no effect on either the level of judgment
effort or the level of judgment conservatism.
Do these findings suggest that financial professionals view all RMPs as a sort of a
ceremonial activity of creating the appearances of a bona fide risk management program,
but in practice such RMPs do not effect actual financial investment decision-making, and
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that investment size alone significantly effects the time it takes and the extent of
consultation sought in order to evaluate and to recommend whether to make a project
investment? The judgments made by this study’s accounting professional participants,
many with career experience working with risk management programs and making
project investment decisions, appear consistent with this conclusion that risk management
programs are to be complied with but do not impact real-world, actual investment
recommendations or decisions – but additional research is needed before definitive
conclusions are drawn. The relationship of RMP type and investment size to other
dependent variables is examined next.
Significant ANOVA Models Related to Other Dependent Variables
In order to better understand and interpret this study’s main findings related to the
four hypotheses, the following sections examine the ANOVA results of other dependent
variables with a significant or a marginally significant model.
Board of directors’ and top managements’ attitude toward risk management. In
Table 17 below, the ANOVA model for BOARD RISK ATTITUDE (i.e., extent the
board of directors’ attitude toward risk management affected your recommendation about
whether the Company should make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.209, pvalue = 0.030, adjusted R-squared = 0.103). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F =
8.054, p-value = 0.006) was found between investment size and BOARD RISK
ATTITUDE. In order to understand the directional effect of investment size on the extent
the board of directors’ attitude toward risk management affected participants’ investment
recommendations, Table 18 below presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent
variable BOARD RISK ATTITUDE on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal effect, 50 =
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moderate effect, and 100 = significant effect). Participants assigned to the relatively small
investment size condition had a mean of 56.07 for the extent that the board of directors’
attitude toward risk management affected the participants’ recommendation. In contrast,
participants assigned to the relatively large investment size had a 71.65 (15.58 points
higher) mean on this factor.
Table 17: ANOVA Results
DV = Extent Board of Directors’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected
Recommendation
(n = 59)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type
Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

df
3
1
1
1
1
55
59
58

Mean Square
F
1480.125
3.209
240222.593 520.807
872.070
1.891
3715.033
8.054
2.664
0.006
461.251

Sig.
0.030**
0.000
0.175
0.006*
0.940

R Squared = 0.149 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.103)
**Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.

Table 18: Compare Means
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small)
DV = Extent Board of Directors’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected
Recommendation

Relatively Small Investment Size

N
28

Mean
56.07

Standard
Deviation
25.19

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Effect
50 = Moderate Effect
100 = Significant Effect

Relatively Large Investment Size

31

71.65

17.42

Total

59

64.25

22.67
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Similarly, Table 19 below reveals that the ANOVA model for the dependent
variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK ATTITUDE (i.e., extent top managements’
attitude toward risk management affected your recommendation about whether the
Company should make the project investment) was marginally significant (F = 2.209, pvalue = 0.097, adjusted R-squared = 0.059). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F=
4.566, p-value = 0.037) was indicated between investment size and TOP
MANAGEMENT RISK ATTITUDE. Once again, in order to understand the directional
effect of investment size on the extent top managements’ attitude toward risk
management affected participants’ investment recommendations, Table 20 below
presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK
ATTITUDE on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal effect, 50 = moderate effect, and 100
= significant effect). Participants assigned to the relatively small investment size
condition had a mean of 56.07 for the extent that the board of directors’ attitude toward
risk management affected the participants’ recommendations. In contrast, participants
assigned to the relatively large investment size condition had a 71.65 (15.58 points
higher) mean on this factor.
Table 19 ANOVA Results
DV = Extent Top Managements’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected
Recommendation
(n = 59)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type
Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment Size
Error
Total

df Mean Square
3
909.190
1 257849.578
1
894.531
1
1879.358
1
78.501
55
411.604
59

F
2.209
626.450
2.173
4.566
0.191

Sig.
0.097**
0.000
0.146
0.037*
0.664
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Corrected Total

58

R Squared = 0.108 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.059)
**Model marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.

Table 20: Compare Means
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small)
DV = Extent Top Managements’ Attitude toward Risk Management Affected
Recommendation

Relatively Small Investment Size

N
28

Mean
60.68

S.D.
23.16

Relatively Large Investment Size

31

71.52

17.47

Total

59

66.37

20.91

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Effect
50 = Moderate Effect
100 = Significant Effect

In summary, the results in Tables 17, 18, 19 and 20 suggest that participants’
perceptions of the board of directors’ and top managements’ attitude toward risk
management were affected by investment size (i.e., such attitudes were greater for a
relatively large investment size than for a relatively small investment size).
Feelings of accountability to the board of directors and top management. Table 21
below likewise reports that the ANOVA model for the dependent variable
ACCOUNTABLE TO BOARD (i.e., extent you feel accountable to the board of directors
for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the Company should
make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.513, p-value = 0.021, adjusted Rsquared = 0.113). Furthermore, a significant relationship (F = 8.023, p-value = 0.006)
was revealed between investment size and ACCOUNTABLE TO BOARD. Table 22
below presents the N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable ACCOUNTABLE TO
BOARD on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal accountability, 50 = moderate
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accountability, and 100 = significant accountability). Participants assigned to the
relatively small investment size condition had a mean of 60.28 for the extent that they felt
accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the participants’
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the relatively large investment size
condition had a 78.10 (17.82 points higher) mean on this factor.
Table 21: ANOVA Results
DV = Extent Feel Accountable to Board of Directors for Risk Associated with
Recommendation
(n = 60)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type
Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

df
3
1
1
1
1
56
60
59

Mean Square
2051.759
286960.780
1014.784
4685.747
418.932
584.030

F
3.513
491.346
1.738
8.023
0.717

Sig.
0.021**
0.000
0.193
0.006*
0.401

R Squared = 0.158 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.113)
**Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.

Table 22: Compare Means
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small)
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Board of Directors for the Risk Associated with
Recommendation

Relatively Small Investment
Size
Relatively Large Investment
Size
Total

N Mean
29 60.28

S.D.
28.21

31

78.10

19.85

60

69.48

25.66

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Accountability
50 = Moderate Accountability
100 = Significant
Accountability
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Similarly, Table 23 below shows that the ANOVA model for the dependent
variable ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT (i.e., extent you feel accountable
to top management for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the
Company should make the project investment) was significant (F = 3.515, p-value =
0.021, adjusted R-squared = 0.113). In this case, a significant relationship (F = 4.997, pvalue = 0.029) was indicated between RMP type and ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP
MANAGEMENT, and a marginally significant relation (p-value = 0.069) was found
between investment size and ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT. Tables 24
and 25 below present the related N, means, and S.D. for the dependent variable
ACCOUNTABLE TO TOP MANAGEMENT on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = minimal
accountability, 50 = moderate accountability, and 100 = significant accountability).
Participants assigned to a ceremonial RMP condition had a mean of 77.75 for the extent
that they felt accountable to top management for the risk associated with the participants’
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the robust RMP condition had an
85.00 (7.25 points higher) mean on this factor. In addition, participants assigned to the
relatively small investment size condition had a mean of 77.83 for the extent that they felt
accountable to top management for the risk associated with the participants’
recommendations. In contrast, participants assigned to the relatively large investment size
condition had a mean of 84.23 (6.40 points higher) mean on this factor.
Table 23: ANOVA Results
DV = Extent Feel Accountable to Top Management for Risk Associated with
Recommendation
(n = 60)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

df

Mean Square
F
Sig.
3
606.210
3.515 0.021***
1 393109.712 2279.297 0.000
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RMP Type
Investment Size
RMP Type * Investment Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

1
1
1
56
60
59

861.862
592.674
375.622
172.470

4.997 0.029**
3.436 0.069*
2.178 0.146

R Squared = 0.158 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.113)
***Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
**Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
*Marginally significant for p-value at the 0.10 level.

Table 24: Compare Means
IV = RMP Type (robust or ceremonial)
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Top Management for the Risk Associated with
Recommendation
N Mean
32 77.75

S.D.
15.18

Robust RMP

28

85.00

11.46

Total

60

81.13

13.95

Ceremonial RMP

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Accountability
50 = Moderate Accountability
100 = Significant
Accountability

Table 25: Compare Means
IV = Investment Size (relatively large or relatively small)
DV = Extent Felt Accountable to Top Management for the Risk Associated with
Recommendation

Relatively Small Investment
Size
Relatively Large Investment
Size
Total

N Mean
29 77.83

S.D.
14.86

31

84.23

12.49

60

81.13

13.95

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Accountability
50 = Moderate Accountability
100 = Significant
Accountability

In summary, the results in Tables 21 and 22 suggest that participants felt
significantly more accountable to the board of directors for the risk associated with the
participants’ recommendations for a relatively large investment size than for a relatively
small investment size. Tables 23, 24, and 25 suggest that participants felt marginally
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significantly more accountable to top management for the risk associated with the
participants’ recommendations for a relatively large investment size than for a relatively
small investment size. Participants also felt significantly more accountable to top
management under a robust RMP than a ceremonial RMP. In any case, such feelings of
accountability to the board of directors or to top management were not great enough to
influence the actual investment recommendation made.
Extent believe top management is risk averse. Finally, Table 26 below indicates
that the ANOVA model for the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK
AVERSE (i.e., extent that you believe top management is risk averse) was significant (F
= 2.926, p-value = 0.042, adjusted R-squared = 0.089). Additionally, a significant
relationship (F = 6.868, p-value = 0.011) was revealed between RMP type and TOP
MANAGEMENT RISK AVERSE. Table 27 below presents the N, means, and S.D. for
the dependent variable TOP MANAGEMENT RISK AVERSE on a scale from 0 to 100
(0 = minimal risk aversion, 50 = moderate risk aversion, and 100 = significant risk
aversion). Participants assigned to the ceremonial RMP condition had a mean of 45.19
for the extent they believed that top management was risk averse. In contrast, participants
assigned to the robust RMP condition had a 58.46 (13.27 points higher) mean on this
factor.
Table 26: ANOVA Results
DV = Extent Believe Top Management is Risk Averse
(n = 60)
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
RMP Type
Investment Size

df

Mean Square
3
1
1
1

1175.582
159132.041
2759.239
312.710

F
2.926
396.072
6.868
0.778

Sig.
0.042**
0.000
0.011*
0.381
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RMP Type * Investment Size
Error
Total
Corrected Total

1
56
60
59

525.478
401.776

1.308

0.258

R Squared = 0.136 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.089)
**Model significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.
*Significant for p-value at the 0.05 level.

Table 27: Compare Means
IV = RMP Type (robust or ceremonial)
DV = Extent Believe Top Management is Risk Averse
N Mean
32 45.19

S.D.
19.80

Robust RMP

28

58.46

20.41

Total

60

51.38

21.00

Ceremonial RMP

0=100 Scale Anchors
0 = Minimal Risk Aversion
50 = Moderate Risk Aversion
100 = Significant Risk
Aversion

In summary, these results suggest that participants assigned to a robust RMP
believed top management was significantly more risk averse than participants assigned to
a ceremonial RMP. However, as in the earlier cases, such beliefs were not sufficient to
influence the actual investment recommendation made.
Factors Considered in Participants’ Responses
Particular themes emerged from a review of the participants’ responses describing
factors that they considered in deciding about whether the Company should make the
case project investment, as well as about how much time and the extent of consultation
that they would need to decide, and with whom they would consult.
Financial investment size. The relative size of the project investment was
identified as a key factor in both the investment recommendation that participants
made/would make and in the effort (relative time and extent of consultation) that
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participants’ would exert. For example, factors considered by participants apparently
assigned to the relatively large investment size condition included “since the investment
amount is big, the risk is also higher,” “it’s a large investment so it has a much bigger
effect on the company as a whole,” and “given the size and potential impact of the
investment, more time is warranted.” In contrast, factors considered by participants
apparently assigned to the relatively small investment size condition included “as a
smaller capital investment, (it) has only a modest, not large, impact on the company’s
ability to achieve overall profit objectives” and “average time (to make recommendation)
due to this being a small project.”
Marketing personnel views. Participants indicated the marketing personnel’s
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s
required return on investment as a factor in the participants’ recommendation and in the
related effort that they would exert. For example, participants’ responses included “the
marketing group (a usually optimistic group) does not feel confident of achieving the 6%
return” and “it sounds like Marketing is not fully committed to the market demand.”
Additional responses reference that the new product is not yet widely accepted in the
market and the need for a higher selling price to attain normal margins (as stated in the
case).
Take advantage of new opportunity. Participants also commented on the possible
advantages of making the new product investment. For example, participants indicated
factors such as “the potential competitive advantage of the new product in the
marketplace and the longer range potential for generating higher profits,” “if (the
Company) doesn’t take the opportunity, a competitor is likely to,” and “if this (new
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product/technology) is trending and we do not capitalize early, we (may) lose out on the
market share.”
Consult many parties before making recommendation. Participants most
frequently identified marketing/sales and production/manufacturing personnel as the
parties that participants would consult. However, participants consistently named that
they would consult with a wide range of people both internally and externally (customers,
retail stores, raw materials suppliers, etc.). For example, one participant responded
“virtually all areas of the company should have input, sales (what can we sell this for?),
marketing (is there demand for this and where?), engineering (design and functionality),
manufacturing (cost to produce), accounting (profitability analysis), risk/legal (any safety
concerns for the consumer, liabilities to us).”
The next section presents the study’s conclusion, implications, limitations, and
opportunities for further research.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH

This study examined the effects of risk management programs (RMPs) on
financial professionals’ project investment judgment conservatism and effort.
Specifically, an online instrument was administered to experienced financial
professionals who were randomly assigned into either a robust RMP or a ceremonial
RMP and then into either a high financial risk or a low financial risk condition.
Participants were then asked to indicate the likelihood that they would recommend to
make a financial project investment and how much time and the extent they would
consult with others to make their recommendation. Based primarily on agency and
accountability theories, I predicted that participants in a robust RMP would make more
conservative recommendations and require more time and consult with more people than
participants in a ceremonial RMP, and that this effect would be greater in a high financial
risk level than in a low financial risk level.
Conclusion
The study results did not support any of the four hypotheses. No significant
relationship was revealed between RMP type (i.e., robust or ceremonial), or between the
interaction of RMP type and financial risk level (i.e., high or low – indicated by a
relatively large or small investment size), and the degree of judgment conservatism
(likelihood participants would recommend to make a financial project investment) or
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judgment effort (relative time and relative extent of consultation needed to make their
recommendation). Furthermore, these results remained unchanged after adding several
possible control variables, including participants’ gender, years of professional
experience, current title, professional certifications, education (highest degree), industry
segment, company revenues, early and later study responders, and a general risk-taking
propensity (based on Nicholson et al. 2005 Risk Taking Index scale). However, a
significant relationship was found between investment size alone and judgment effort
(relative time and relative consultation to make the project investment recommendation).
While I cannot conclude that RMP type does not affect financial professionals’
judgment conservative or judgment effort, the null hypothesis that RMP type has no
effect on such judgment conservatism and effort cannot be rejected based on the results
of this study. One interpretation of these findings may be that in practice RMPs often are
essentially ceremonial (supported by institutional theory) developed primarily to create
the appearance of an organization-wide, integrated risk management approach and to
demonstrate compliance with regulations (e.g., COSO, 2004; NYSE, 2013), while not
affecting management behavior or decision-making (e.g., the actual financial investment
project decisions). A more positive interpretation of these findings may be that ERM does
indeed promote an effective, responsible, organization-wide and integrated approach to
risk management without interfering with necessary, healthy, entrepreneurial risk-taking
decisions and activities (within the organization’s risk appetite) that is required to achieve
entity objectives. More research is needed on these issues.
In addition to examining the effects of RMP type and investment size on the
study’s primary dependent variables of judgment conservatism and judgment effort,
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additional ANOVA models revealed significant or marginally significant relationships
between RMP type and/or investment size and other dependent variables. For example,
investment size was significantly related to the extent that participants’ recommendations
were affected by the Boards’ attitude toward risk management and the extent participants
felt accountable to the Board. Similarly, investment size was marginally related to the
extent that participants’ recommendations were affected by top managements’ attitude
toward risk management and the extent participants felt accountable to top management.
However, RMP type was also significantly related only to the extent participants felt
accountable to top management and to the extent that participants believed top
management was risk averse. However, none of these additional significant relationships
involving other dependent variables were sufficient to influence participants’ actual
project investment recommendations.
Implications
This study’s results offer implications for practitioners, policymakers, and
academics. First, the study’s results inform practitioners. Specifically, while COSO
(2004) defines ERM by relating organization-wide risks to the achievement of entity
objectives, in practice this does not necessarily mean that ERM should constrain healthy,
entrepreneurial risk-taking in management decision-making (e.g., project investment
decisions) within the entity’s risk appetite. Second, policymakers (e.g., SEC, COSO,
NYSE) should carefully consider the results of this study to better understand the
possible impact of risk management regulations and guidelines on public company
project investment decision-making, extent that the board’s and top management’s risk
management attitude affects financial decision-making, financial professionals’ feelings
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of accountability to top management for risk associated with financial recommendations,
and financial professionals’ beliefs about top management risk aversion.
Finally, as the first study that I am aware of to examine the effects of risk
management programs on financial professional judgments and decision-making, this
study has implications for academic research and theory. Specifically, this study uses
accountability and agency theories to hypothesize more conservative financial
professional judgments within a robust RMP (a higher risk management accountability
condition than a ceremonial RMP). While greater levels of accountability resulted in
greater judgment conservatism and effort in many auditor studies (e.g., Asare et al., 2000;
DeZoort et al., 2006; Koonce et al., 1995), in the present study greater ERM
accountability (represented by a robust RMP versus a ceremonial RMP) did not produce
such a relationship. This finding of no relationship between RMP type and financial
professional judgment conservatism appears consistent with institutional theory. Perhaps
in the marketplace the applicability of agency theory or institutional theory may depend
on the corporate subject matter and/or the governance players involved. In addition, the
results of this study do not appear to be consistent with the acceptability heuristic
(Tetlock: 1992, 1985; Mero et al., 2007), which advances a strategy of coping with
accountability by making judgments that are acceptable to the parties to whom an
individual is accountable. In the present study, a significant relationship was found
between RMP type and both the extent participants felt accountable to top management
and the extent participants believed top management was risk averse, yet no relationship
was indicated between RMP type and judgment conservatism (likelihood participants
would make recommend that the Company make the project investment).
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Limitations
This study is subject to several standard limitations applicable to experimental
design and survey research based on case study material. These limitations include
external validity, representativeness of the participant group, the potential for demand
effects, and small sample size. In addition, the robust RMP condition in the experiment
intentionally describes characteristics of an ERM process with a primary goal of
effectively managing organizational risks (i.e., ERM support of top management and the
board, appointment of an active and qualified CRO, and internal audit focused on ERM
evaluation). In contrast, the ceremonial RMP condition in the experiment intentionally
describes characteristics of an ERM process with a primary goal of merely creating the
appearances of a regulatory-compliant ERM (i.e., approval but lack of support of RMP
by top management and the board, appointment of an individual lacking ERM experience
to oversee the low-priority RMP program, and internal audit not focused on ERM
evaluation). However, in practice there is evidence of elements of both a robust and a
ceremonial RMP (e.g., Viscelli, 2013; Cohen et al., 2015) existing simultaneously within
the same organization. Another limitation of the study is the limited information that is
provided to participants on which to base their recommendation. Although the instrument
was examined and pre-tested by practicing professionals and risk management experts to
ensure that relevant and realistic case information was included, the time constraints of
the experiment necessarily limits the quantity of information that can be provided.
Finally, although there have been calls for more ERM research, ERM experimental
studies are new. As additional research is performed, greater understanding of the most
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effective experimental design for this area may be available that will address certain
limitations.
Future Research
This study responds to previous calls for academic research on ERM and
decision-making (e.g., Omega: The International Journal of Management Science) and
on ERM and corporate governance (e.g., Journal of Enterprise Risk Management).
Additional research may involve other key ERM corporate players as participants, such
as board members, senior management, and auditors. Gaining insights into the
perspectives and judgments of these other ERM participants will expand our
understanding of ERM and management decision-making, as well as the motivations and
academic theories on which those decisions are based.
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From: IMA Director of Research
Subject: Participation in an IMA Award Winning Study Performed by a KSU Doctoral
Candidate
Dear IMA Members:
I am writing to ask for your help in an online study being conducted by Jim Boyle, a
Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) student at Kennesaw State University. This
study is part of Jim’s dissertation research focused on improving our understanding of
financial managers’ judgments.
The study has been awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral
Student Grant Program and is being performed under the oversight of Institutional
Review Boards at the University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, as well as
his dissertation committee (Dr. Dana Hermanson, Dr. Todd DeZoort, and Dr. Jennifer
Schafer).
Your participation is very important to the success of this study. I encourage you to
click on the link below to complete the study, which should take approximately 20-25
minutes.
Everyone who completes the study will be eligible to enter a drawing to win one (1)
of three $100 American Express gift certificates.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants. The researchers will not disclose your
name or any other identifying information, and they will not collect IP addresses.
Please click the link below to begin the study.
https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB
Thank you for your support.
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From: IMA Director of Research
Subject: SECOND REQUEST - What are your thoughts on financial managers’
judgments?
Dear IMA Member,
This is a follow-up to my October 31st email. If you have already participated in the
study, thank you and please disregard this message. If you have not yet participated, we
would greatly appreciate your participation in this important research!
Can you spare less than 30 minutes to provide your thoughts on financial managers’
judgments? Everyone who completes this study is eligible to enter a drawing to win
one (1) of three $100 American Express gift certificates. Click this link to participate
in the study.
As part of his dissertation research, Jim Boyle, a Doctor of Business Administration
(DBA) student at Kennesaw State University, is conducting research that focuses on
improving our understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The study has been
awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral Student Grant
Program and is being performed under the oversight of Institutional Review Boards at the
University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University, as well as his dissertation
committee (Dr. Dana Hermanson, Dr. Todd DeZoort, and Dr. Jennifer Schafer).
Your participation is very important to the success of this study and the improvement of
our profession’s understanding of financial managers’ judgments. I encourage you to
complete the study by clicking this link. The study should take approximately 20-25
minutes to complete.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of the other participants. The researchers will not disclose
your name or any other identifying information, and they will not collect IP addresses.
Please click https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB to
begin the study.
Thank you for your thoughts and your support of this important research.
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From: IMA Director of Research
Subject: FINAL REQUEST – RECEIVE VALUABLE RESEARCH RESULTS
FOR YOUR FIRM
Dear IMA Members:
I am writing one last time to ask for your help for a doctoral student at Kennesaw State
University (Jim Boyle). He is conducting a very interesting study that focuses on
improving our understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The study has been
awarded a grant through the IMA Research Foundation’s Doctoral Student Grant
Program. This study is also part of Jim’s dissertation research and your help is very
much needed to ensure an adequate sample size for project success.
As a participant, you will have the opportunity to receive a summary of the results that
may help your firm’s financial managers’ judgments. In addition, you will be eligible to
win one (1) of three $100 American Express gift certificates.
I encourage you to click on the link below to complete the study, which should take
approximately 20-25 minutes. Your responses will be completely confidential and will
be analyzed only after being combined with the responses of other participants. The
researchers will not disclose your name or any other identifying information.
Study Link: https://scranton.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0p0iv3QZb38UKAB
Thank you for your help with this important research project.
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Q1

Consent to Participate in “A Study of Financial Managers’ Judgments”

James F. Boyle, CPA, MBA
Dana R. Hermanson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Accounting Professor of Accounting
The University of Scranton
Kennesaw State University
james.boyle@scranton.edu
dhermans@kennesaw.edu
(570) 955-6924
(770) 423-6077

Todd DeZoort, Ph.D.,
CFE
Professor of Accounting
The University of
Alabama
tdezoort@cba.ua.edu
(205) 348-6694

We are performing a study to better understand financial managers’ project investment
judgments. This study is funded by the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA)
Research Foundation. There are no risks from completing the study.
We realize that your time is valuable, and to show our appreciation, you have the
opportunity to opt-in to a drawing to win a $100 American Express gift certificate (three
certificates will be awarded). Upon completion of the study, you will be prompted to
participate in this drawing.
While you will receive no direct benefit for participating, you will be contributing to our
understanding of financial managers’ judgments. The procedures involve you evaluating
a hypothetical case and responding to a series of questions. Your participation in this
study is voluntary, and you can discontinue participation at any time. The study should
take approximately 20-25 minutes.
Your completion of this study constitutes informed consent to participate in the study.
Your responses will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being
combined with the responses of other participants. We will not access or link any
individual identifying information to your response, and we will not collect IP addresses.
If you have any additional comments or questions about the study, please contact any of
the researchers indicated above.
Research at the University of Scranton and Kennesaw State University that involves
human participants is carried out under the oversight of Institutional Review Boards. If
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, or if you believe you
have suffered an injury as a result of taking part in the research study, you may contact
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Dr. Tabbi Miller-Scandle, IRB Administrator, Office of Research and Sponsored
Programs, University of Scranton at (570) 941-5824 or tabbi.millerscandle@scranton.edu. Questions or problems regarding these activities should also be
addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain
Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (678) 797-2268.
We greatly appreciate your help in our efforts to understand financial manager
judgments!
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I
understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at
any time without penalty.
I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the
questions.

Q2
Instructions
1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case for your consideration. The case
includes summary
background information and some related questions for you to answer.
2. Please assume that you are working as a financial manager for the Company
when evaluating the
case and answering the questions. As the financial manager, you report to the
Controller and are called
on to evaluate and recommend whether the Company should pursue project
investment opportunities.
The success or failure of your investment recommendations is considered in your
performance
evaluation and in determining your base pay adjustments and any incentive pay
(e.g., bonuses).
3. Please complete the materials in the order presented. There are no right or wrong
answers, so please
answer the questions in a way that reflects your honest opinions and judgments.

Thank you for your participation!
Q3
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Main Appliance Manufacturing, Inc.
Company and Industry Background
Main Appliance Manufacturing, Inc. (hereafter “the Company”) is a publicly-traded
company, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, that manufactures and distributes a
full line of household appliances to retailers throughout the United States. The Company
operates in a competitive market affected by brand name, price, quality, and customer
service. Customer demand has held steady in recent years, and the industry appears
relatively robust. Company and industry sales and profitability have rebounded from the
negative financial impact associated with the recent recession.
Financial Performance
The Company has experienced growth and margins over the years that are comparable to
average companies in the industry. The following financial data have been derived from
the Company’s financial statements. All amounts are in millions ($).

Net sales
Net income
Total assets

2009
$1,012
25
809

2010
$1,053
41
865

2011
$1,055
33
875

2012
$1,115
32
900

2013
$1,136
35
925

Cash flows from operations have remained positive each year from 2009 to 2013.
Profitability and trend level expectations from analysts, institutional investors, and
creditors have been optimistic and reasonable.
Capital Budgeting Policy: Required Rates of Return on Project Investments
The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy was approved by the board of directors’
investment committee and is applicable to all project investments. This policy established
the Company’s current 6% minimum required return on project investments.
Top Management
Management has been led for the past 15 years by an experienced CEO. The Company’s
CFO has been with the Company for 10 years and is a CPA with public accounting
experience in one of the “Big Four” accounting firms. Management compensation is
competitive with the industry, and incentive compensation (e.g., bonuses, stock options)
is primarily based on operating results, financial position, and cash flow from operations.
Board of Directors and Audit Committee
The Company’s full board meets six times per year. Individual board committees (e.g.,
compensation, investment, audit, etc.) each set their own meeting schedule (often every
quarter) and consist of members with specialized professional expertise appropriate to
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their board committee duties.
The Company’s audit committee is composed of four independent directors. The audit
committee meets seven times per year (every other month plus an additional meeting
with the external audit firm at year end). The Audit Committee Chair (ACC) has been a
Company director and the ACC for the past eight years. The ACC and two other audit
committee members are CPAs with public accounting experience. The fourth audit
committee member has a finance degree and significant experience in the household
appliance manufacturing industry.
External Independent Auditor
The current audit firm is one of the Big Four accounting firms. The firm has audited the
Company for the past five years, with a clean opinion issued each year and no significant
audit issues noted during this period.
Internal Audit Department
The Company has an internal audit department that conducts operational audits, performs
internal control reviews, and assists the independent audit firm with the annual financial
audit.
Q4 – Risk Management Program Type Manipulation – Robust
Risk Management Program
The board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk
management program (i.e., an enterprise risk management (ERM) program) primarily to
ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks. SEC regulations mandate
public company board members to disclose their risk oversight role. In addition, New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) standards require that the Company’s audit committee
discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk exposures. The
board has delegated responsibility for overseeing the ERM process implemented by
management to the audit committee, but the full board monitors the top risk exposures
identified by that process. The full board and the audit committee have assumed an active
role in providing risk oversight and have placed a high priority on giving attention to risk
management. The CEO and CFO share the board’s genuine enthusiasm for the
Company’s ERM program, and they are willing to expend the required resources to
ensure that it is properly implemented.
Management has appointed a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), who was previously employed
as a CRO for a manufacturing company in a similar industry as the Company, to assume
risk oversight responsibilities. The CRO, who has specialized risk management
experience, meets with the CEO and the CFO to discuss the Company’s risk exposures
once each month. The audit committee also meets with the CRO each quarter to engage
in substantive risk management discussions about key financial, operational, and
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reputational risks. The CRO’s risk management recommendations are taken seriously and
acted upon in a timely manner.
The internal audit plan includes audits of the ERM program. The internal audit staff
receives continuing professional education in risk management practices.
Capital budgeting project investment decisions fall under the Company’s ERM program.
Q5 – Risk Management Program Type Manipulation – Ceremonial
Risk Management Program
The board of directors has directed management to establish an organization-wide risk
management program (i.e., an enterprise risk management (ERM) program) primarily to
demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with regulations. SEC regulations
mandate public company board members to disclose their risk oversight role. In addition,
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) standards require that the Company’s audit
committee discuss the firm’s risk management process and major financial risk
exposures. The board has delegated responsibility for overseeing the ERM process
implemented by management to the audit committee, but the full board is supposed to be
informed of the top risk exposures identified by that process. The full board and the audit
committee have not assumed an active role in providing risk oversight and have not
placed a high priority on giving attention to risk management. The CEO and CFO
understand the board’s intent of demonstrating compliance with regulations, and they do
not support expending resources for an ERM program.
Management has appointed the Controller of the Company to assume risk oversight
responsibilities. The Controller, who lacks specialized risk management experience,
occasionally mentions the Company’s risk exposures to the CEO and the CFO as part of
other meetings that focus on financial reporting issues. The Controller ensures that the
matter of “risk oversight” appears in the board minutes once each calendar year by
including this topic on the agenda of the annual meeting with the audit committee related
to internal controls. The Controller does not make any risk management
recommendations.
The internal audit plan does not include audits of the ERM program. The internal audit
staff receives continuing professional education in internal controls.
Capital budgeting project investment decisions fall under the Company’s ERM program.
Q6 – Financial Risk Level Manipulation – High (Large Investment Size)
Possible New Product Introduction
The Company’s top management is presently considering a capital budgeting decision for
a new product introduction that requires a large financial investment (relative to other
project investments). The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy established a 6%
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minimum required return on project investments. Missing the minimum required return
on relatively large investments significantly impacts the Company’s ability to meet its
overall profitability goals.
The Company’s top management must decide whether to introduce a new household
appliance. Manufacturing of the new product will require a large financial investment
(relative to other project investments) in production equipment modifications and in the
purchase of raw materials. The new appliance is a “swift-cook” oven that uses halogen
bulbs to enable reduced cooking times, while retaining conventional oven cooking flavor.
The swift-cook oven is not yet widely accepted in the market, and the retail selling price
would need to be slightly higher than established conventional oven prices in order to
achieve normal gross margins. Manufacturing of the swift-cook ovens would be funded
through internal funds. Consultation with the Company’s marketing personnel reveals
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s 6%
minimum required rate of return on project investments.
Q7 – Financial Risk Level Manipulation – Low (Small Investment Size)
Possible New Product Introduction
The Company’s top management is presently considering a capital budgeting decision for
a new product introduction that requires a small financial investment (relative to other
project investments). The Company’s Capital Budgeting Policy established a 6%
minimum required return on project investments. Missing the minimum required return
on relatively small investments modestly impacts the Company’s ability to meet its
overall profitability goals.
The Company’s top management must decide whether to introduce a new household
appliance. Manufacturing of the new product will require a small financial investment
(relative to other project investments) in production equipment modifications and in the
purchase of raw materials. The new appliance is a “swift-cook” oven that uses halogen
bulbs to enable reduced cooking times, while retaining conventional oven cooking flavor.
The swift-cook oven is not yet widely accepted in the market, and the retail selling price
would need to be slightly higher than established conventional oven prices in order to
achieve normal gross margins. Manufacturing of the swift-cook ovens would be funded
through internal funds. Consultation with the Company’s marketing personnel reveals
mixed views about whether the new product introduction will meet the Company’s 6%
minimum required rate of return on project investments.
Q8
As a financial manager charged with evaluating and making recommendations about
whether the Company should pursue project investment opportunities, please slide the bar
below to indicate the likelihood you would recommend that the Company make the
financial investment to manufacture the new swift-cook oven (0 = Not at all likely, 50 =
Moderately likely, 100 = Very likely).
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Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q9
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above.
Q10
Please slide the bar below to indicate how much time you would take to develop a
recommendation for this project investment relative to a typical project investment
recommendation (0 = Much less time, 50 = About average time, 100 = Much more time).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q11
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above.
Q12
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you would consult with others to
develop a recommendation for this project investment relative to a typical project
investment recommendation (0 = Much less consultation, 50 = About average
consultation, 100 = Much more consultation).
Q13
Please describe the factors you considered in your response to the question above.
Q14
Please indicate the individual(s) with whom you would consult.
Q15 through Q19
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that the following factors affected your
recommendation about whether the Company should make the project investment (0 =
Minimal effect, 50 = Moderate effect, 100 = Significant effect).
Board of directors’ attitude toward risk management
Sliding scale o to 100
Top managements’ attitude toward risk management
Sliding scale 0 to 100

104

The employee appointed in charge of risk oversight
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Internal audit's level of evaluation of the Company’s ERM program
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Relative size of the project investment
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q20 and Q21
Please slide the bar below to indicate to what extent you feel accountable to the below
parties for the risk associated with your recommendation about whether the Company
should make the project investment (0 = Minimal accountability, 50 = Moderate
accountability, 100 = Significant accountability).
Board of directors
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Top management
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q22 and Q23
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you believe the below parties are risk
averse (0 = Minimal risk aversion, 50 = Moderate risk aversion, 100 = Significant risk
aversion).
Board of directors
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Top management
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q24
Please slide the bar below to indicate the level of risk for this project investment (0 =
Low risk, 50 = Moderate risk, 100 = High risk).
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Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q25 and Q26
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent that you believe the below parties support
the Company's ERM program (0 = Minimal support, 50 = Moderate support, 100 =
Significant support).
Board of directors
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Top management
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q27
Please answer the following questions without referring back to the prior screens.
Q28 – Manipulation Check – Risk Management Program Type
Please indicate the Company’s primary motivation for establishing its ERM program
based on the facts of the case:
To ensure that the Company is effectively managing its risks
To demonstrate that the Company is in compliance with SEC and NYSE
regulations
Q29 – Manipulation Check – Financial Risk Level

Please indicate the relative size of the project investment in this case:
Large
Small
Q30
Please slide the bar below to indicate how realistic this case was (0 = Very unrealistic, 50
= Moderately realistic, 100 = Very realistic).
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Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q31
Please slide the bar below to indicate how understandable this case was (0 = Very
difficult to understand, 50 = Moderately understandable, 100 = Very understandable).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Please indicate whether you have had any experience with a risk management program in
your career.
No
Yes

Q32
The focus of ERM programs varies among organizations. Some organizations merely
focus on compliance with regulations (i.e., a compliance-based ERM focus), while other
organizations also focus on effectively managing risks (i.e., a risk-based ERM focus).
Please slide the bar below to indicate the primary focus of the risk management
program(s) you have experienced in your career (0 = Primarily compliance-based ERM
focus, 100 = Primarily risk-based ERM focus).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
Q33
Please indicate whether you have had any professional experience in making project
investment recommendations or decisions in your career .
No
Yes

Q34
Please slide the bar below to indicate the extent of your professional experience in
making project investment recommendations or decisions (0 = Minimal experience, 50 =
Moderate experience, 100 = Significant experience).
Sliding scale 0 to 100
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Q35
Please slide the bar below to describe the degree that your overall professional experience
in making project investment recommendations or decisions has been favorable (0 = Very
unfavorable, 100 = Very favorable).
Sliding scale from 0 to 100
Q36 through Q47
The following set of questions relates to general risk-taking situations and is not related
to the specific case study.
Please could you tell us if any of the following have ever applied to you, now or in your
adult past?
All using 5-point scale (1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Occasionally, 4 = Often, 5 = Very
Often)
Recreational risks (e.g., rock-climbing, scuba diving)
Health risks (e.g., smoking, poor diet, high alcohol consumption)
Career risks (e.g., quitting a job without another to go to)
Financial risks (e.g., gambling, risky investments)
Safety risks (e.g., fast driving, cycling without a helmet)
Social risks (e.g., standing for election, publicly challenging a rule or decision)
The questions that follow are for classification purposes only. No effort will be made to
identify you based on the information you provide.
Q48
Please indicate your gender.
Male
Female
Q49
Please indicate your total years of professional business experience.
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Less than 5 years
5 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
Over 25 years
Q50
Please indicate your current title.
CFO
Financial Manager
Controller
Assistant Controller
Staff Accountant
External Auditor
Internal Auditor
Other
Q51
Please indicate below any professional certifications that you hold (check all that apply).
CMA
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CPA
CFA
Other (please indicate below)
I do not hold any professional certifications

Q52
Please indicate your highest degree.
High School/Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Law Degree
Doctoral Degree (e.g., Ph.D, DBA)
Q53
Please indicate the segment in which you currently work.
Public Company
Private For-Profit Company
Not-For-Profit
Government
Public Accounting
Other
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Q54
Please indicate the approximate annual revenue of your employer.
Less than $10 million
$10 million to $100 million
$101 million to $500 million
$501 million to $1 billion
More than $1 billion
Q55
Please share any additional thoughts you may have about this case.
Q56
Your responses have been recorded and will remain strictly confidential. If you would
like to be entered in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing and/or receive a
summary report of the aggregate survey responses, please check the appropriate box(es)
below and provide an e-mail address where we may contact you for these purposes.
(Your e-mail address will only be used for these purposes and will be disassociated from
your survey responses.)
Enter me in the $100 American Express gift certificate drawing (please
provide email address below).
Please send me a summary report of the survey responses (please provide
email address below).

Q57
Please provide email address below if you indicated that you wanted to enter in the
drawing and/or be provided a summary report.
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.
Your response has been recorded.

